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BETTING ON THE LIVES OF STRANGERS:  LIFE 
SETTLEMENTS, STOLI, AND SECURITIZATION 
Susan Lorde Martin* 
 
Life insurance serves the important purpose of providing a means for 
families and businesses to survive the premature death of a person whose 
support they require to maintain themselves.  Over time, life insurance has 
become a much more sophisticated financial product incorporating savings 
plans, mutual fund investments, and securitizations.  This article recounts 
the history of life insurance including the development of the insurable 
interest doctrine.  It describes life settlements, especially stranger-
originated life insurance (STOLI) policies, which represent a particular 
abuse of the purpose of life insurance.  The article discusses the 
securitization of pools of life insurance policies, reminiscent of the 
securitization of sub-prime mortgages.  Then state and federal attempts at 
regulation and a variety of lawsuits are summarized.  The article concludes 
that life insurance is such an important protection for families and 
businesses that its availability for its primary purpose should not be 
compromised by becoming the basis for complicated, misunderstood, and, 
in some cases, fraudulent financial products. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Life insurance serves the important purpose of providing a means for 
families and businesses to deal with the premature death of a person whose 
support they require to maintain themselves.  Over time, life insurance has 
become a much more sophisticated financial product incorporating savings 
plans, mutual fund investments, and securitizations. 
The idea of life insurance has always been problematic because, from 
a financial viewpoint alone, the insurance company wins if insured clients 
enjoy long lives during which they make many premium payments before 
the company has to pay a death benefit.  The beneficiary, on the other hand, 
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gets the best financial return if the insured dies quickly.  So, the problem 
has always been to get the advantages of life insurance without 
encouraging gaming by people betting on the imminent death of anyone 
they care to insure.  The latter situation raises the unpleasant circumstance 
of ―a pure wager that gives the [policy owner] a sinister counter interest in 
having the life come to an end.‖
1
 
To counteract having life insurance encourage murder, the insurable 
interest doctrine became an important part of insurance law.  In the 1980s, 
however, the doctrine became an impediment to a use of life insurance 
policies that had not been considered before.  People with AIDS were 
suffering dire medical and financial circumstances to be followed by a sure 
and imminent death.  The idea of viatical settlements developed to allow 
AIDS patients to sell their existing life insurance policies to strangers, who 
would pay for them immediately in exchange for receiving the death 
benefit.
2  
The viatical settlement industry waned as medical advances 
allowed AIDS patients to maintain their jobs and live longer lives.
3
   
However, viatical settlements remained appealing to insurance agents, 
brokers, consultants, and other financial entrepreneurs so the life settlement 
industry developed to allow any elderly life insurance policy owner to sell 
their policy to a third party stranger for quick cash in exchange for naming 
the stranger as the beneficiary.
4
 
This new industry created novel and complicated financial products, 
the need for a great deal of legislation to curb abuses of the elderly and 
investors, and a great deal of litigation.  This article recounts the history of 
life insurance, including the development of the insurable interest doctrine.
5
  
It describes life settlements, especially stranger-originated life insurance 
(STOLI) policies which represent a particular abuse of the purpose of life 
insurance.
6
  Next, the article discusses the securitization of pools of life 
insurance policies, reminiscent of the securitization of sub-prime 
mortgages.
7  
A summary of state and federal attempts at regulation and a 
 
 1. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 154 (1911) (Holmes, J.) (dictum) (reasoning on 
the one hand that a ―public policy [which] refuses to allow insurance to be taken out by . . . 
persons [who have no interest in the life insured]‖ in itself suggests there is reason to reject 
a later assignment to such persons, but on the other that ―[t]he law has no universal cynic 
fear of the temptation opened by a pecuniary benefit accruing upon a death,‖ and that since 
―life insurance has become . . . one of the best recognized forms of investment‖ it would be 
desirable ―[s]o far as reasonable safety permits . . . to give to life policies the ordinary 
characteristics of property‖). 
 2. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 8-59 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 95-129 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 132-186 and accompanying text. 
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variety of lawsuits follows.
8
  The article concludes that life insurance is 
such an important protection for families and businesses that it should not 
be unnecessarily complicated by being combined with other financial 
products.  The power of insurance companies makes it a sure thing that life 
insurance will never be separated from savings and investment plans.  
There is still time, however, to keep life insurance from being entirely 
separated from its primary purpose.  Securitization of life insurance pools 
should not be permitted because they serve no purpose related to protecting 
against mortality risk.  Life settlements should be permitted only as an 
exception to the insurable interest doctrine when the insured is suffering in 
dire medical, family, or financial circumstances, all of which should be 
easy to prove and would not greatly add to the burden of the already-
burdened insured person. 
II. BACKGROUND:  LIFE INSURANCE AND INSURABLE INTEREST 
 A.  Early History 
Life insurance originated in Genoa and other Mediterranean cities in 
the early fifteenth century as a result of merchants buying marine insurance 
policies for ships with cargoes that included slaves.
9
  By the mid-fifteenth 
century, borrowers were using life insurance to get credit more easily and 
cheaply by insuring their own lives and naming their lenders as 
beneficiaries.
10
  Lenders diminished their risks by insuring the lives of their 
borrowers.
11
  At that time in Genoa, there were many large life insurance 
policies on the lives of Pope Nicholas V and the King of Aragon, as well as 
other public figures, because of these money-lending practices.
12
 
These insurance arrangements persuaded many people with no 
financial interest in the lives of popes and princes to take out insurance 
policies on their lives as mere wagers.
13
  To eliminate such disreputable 
gambling, most European cities and states began prohibiting the sale of life 
insurance policies, either on the lives of certain people,
14
 or in all 
 
 8. See infra notes and 205-351 accompanying text. 
 9. GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN 
ENGLAND, 1695-1775 13 (1999) (citing 1 GIUSEPPE STEFANI, INSURANCE IN VENICE FROM 
THE ORIGINS TO THE END OF THE SERENISSIMA 118-19 (Trieste, 1958) (Italy) and 1 FEDERIGO 
MELIS, ORIGINI E SVILUPPI DELLE ASSICURAZIONI IN ITALIA (SECOLI XIV-XVI) [ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF INSURANCE IN ITALY (14TH-16TH CENTURIES)] 210 and plate 49 (Rome, 
1975) (Italy) (depicting the earliest surviving life insurance contract)). 
 10. CLARK, supra note 9, at 14 (citing to 1 STEFANI, supra note 9, at 119 and 2 STEFANI 
at 339). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. (citing to 1 MELIS, supra note 9, at 214-17 (reproducing the policies on the lives 
of these two potentates, and others)). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 14-15 (describing the increasingly restrictive atmosphere for life insurance 
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circumstances.
15
 
Life insurance was first introduced in England in the middle of the 
sixteenth century by Italian merchants,
16
 and it was never banned there.
17
  
Even though it was probably considered unsavory to be wagering on 
human lives, the English Parliament used life insurance policies as a source 
of revenue by taxing them.
18
  By the eighteenth century, using insurance to 
bet on strangers‘ lives—usually those in the public eye—became a popular 
English gambling activity.
19
  By the middle to the end of the same century, 
however, the activity began to attract significant public hostility.
20
  In 
response, Parliament enacted the Life Assurance Act of 1774, prefaced as 
―[a]n Act for Regulating Insurances upon Lives, and for Prohibiting All 
such Insurances Except in Cases Where the Persons Insuring Shall Have an 
Interest in the Life or Death of the Persons Insured.‖
21
  The Act stated: 
Whereas it hath been found by experience that the making of 
insurances on lives . . . wherein the assured shall have no 
interest[,] hath introduced a mischievous kind of gaming[,] . . . no 
insurance shall be made . . . on the life . . . of any person . . . 
wherein the person . . . for whose . . . benefit . . . such policy . . . 
shall be made, shall have no interest, or by way of gaming or 
wagering. . . . and in all cases where the insured hath interest in 
such life . . . no greater sum shall be recovered . . . from the 
insurer . . . than the amount of value of the interest of the insured 
 
policies in fifteenth-century Italy, after the Venetian Senate forbade wagers on the life of the 
pope and nullified many prior bets, and Genoa prohibited insurance ―on the lives of princes‖ 
and extended the prohibition—in a further proclamation of 1494—to any insurance policies 
or wagers without prior approval from the Senate ―on the lives of the pope or emperor, 
‗kings, cardinals, dukes, princes, bishops, or other eminent persons either spiritual or 
temporal‘‖). 
 15. Id. at 14-16 (listing other places in Europe outside of Italy, where disreputable 
associations with gambling led to outright prohibitions, including the general prohibition in 
the Spanish Ordinances of Barcelona, the French restrictions including those in Louis XIV‘s 
Marine Code—which had some loopholes leading to exceptions like ―ransom insurance‖ for 
the lives of slaves—and Phillip II‘s ban on life insurance contracts in the Low Countries, 
later adopted by the ordinances of Amsterdam, Middelburg, and Rotterdam). 
 16. Id. at 4. 
 17. Id. at 21. 
 18. Id.; see Stamp Act, 1694, 5 & 6 W. & M., c. 21 (Eng.) (―[A]n A[ct] for granting to 
theire Majesties severall Dutyes upon Velum Parchment and Paper for Four Yeares [for the 
purpose of] carryyng on the warr against France[, to be levied upon . . .] every Skinn or 
Peice of Velum or Parchment or Sheete of Paper upon which any Charter-party Policy of 
Assurance[,] Passport[,] Bond[,] Release[,] Contract or other Obligatory Instrument or any 
Protest Procurac[i]on[,] Letter of Attorney or any other Notariall Act whatsoever . . . in the 
su[m]me of Six pence‖). 
 19. CLARK, supra note 9, at 49-51. 
 20. Id. at 52-53. 
 21. 14 Geo. 3, c. 48 (Eng.). 
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in such life.
22 
This Act created the concept of insurable interest, although it did not 
define the term.  To this day, insurable interest remains an important idea in 
insurance law in the United States.
23 
 B.  Insurable Interest 
In the late nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that an 
insurable interest is required to purchase a life insurance policy, but it ―is 
not easy to define with precision what will in all cases constitute an 
insurable interest, so as to take the contract out of the class of wager 
policies.‖
24
  The Court held that life insurance policies purchased without 
an insurable interest in the insured are against public policy because they 
constitute ―a mere wager, by which the party taking the policy is directly 
interested in the early death of the [in]sured.  Such policies have a tendency 
to create a desire for the event.‖
25
  Thirty years later, Justice Holmes stated 
that a ―contract of insurance upon a life in which the insured has no interest 
is a pure wager that gives the insured a sinister counter interest in having 
the life come to an end.‖
26
 
At the onset of the twenty-first century in the United States, some 
aspects of the meaning of insurable interest are well established.  It has 
been accepted for more than a hundred years that each person has an 
insurable interest in his or her own life and, therefore, has the right to 
insure his or her own life, naming someone else as the beneficiary.
27
  In 
addition, many states have statutes outlining other circumstances where an 
insurable interest exists for life insurance.  Most of the statutes describe 
two situations where there is an insurable interest:  (1) there is a close 
blood or legal relationship that engenders love and affection,
28
 or (2) there 
is a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage through the continued 
 
 22. Id., Preamble, §§ 1, 3. 
 23. Anthony Alt, Note, Spin-Life Insurance Policies: A Dizzying Effect on Human 
Dignity and the Death of Life Insurance, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 605, 612-13 (2009). 
 24. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881).  See generally Peter Nash Swisher, 
The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance: A Critical Reassessment, 53 DRAKE 
L. REV. 477 (2005). 
 25. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. at 779. 
 26. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 154 (1911). 
 27. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U.S. 561, 564 (1876). 
 28. Up until 1840, ―affection,‖ as in the relationships among spouses, parents, and 
children, was not considered a sufficient insurable interest.  That changed in 1840 when 
New York, followed by other states, enacted a law that was interpreted so that wives were 
no longer required to prove their pecuniary interest in their insured husbands.  Sharon Ann 
Murphy, Life Insurance in the United States through World War I, in EH.NET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/murphy.life.insurance.us (last updated 
Aug. 14, 2002). 
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life of the insured person and consequent loss by reason of his or her 
death.
29
  The latter situation contemplates the interests of creditors or 
sureties who have obvious financial interests in the continued life of the 
insured.  The statutes also often create a specific corporate insurable 
interest in the lives of any directors, officers, or employees whose death 
might cause financial loss to the corporation.
30
  Starting in the mid-1980s, 
after intense lobbying by insurance companies, many states expanded their 
categories of those with insurable interests to include corporations and 
banks for the lives of rank-and-file employees, and charities for the lives of 
consenting donors.
31
 
 
 29. See generally ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(a) (2008); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.020(d)(1) & 
(2) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1104(C)(1) & (2) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-
103(c)(1)(A) & (B) (2009); CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(a) (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
18, § 2704(c)(1) & (2) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(a) (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-
1804(3)(a) & (b) (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-040(4)(a) & (b) (2009); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2404(3)(A) & (B) (2009); MD. CODE ANN., Ins. § 12-201(b)(2)(i) & 
(b)(3) (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-251(3)(a) & (b) (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-
201 (3)(a) & (b) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 687B.040(4) (2008); N.Y. INS. LAW § 
3205(a)(1)(A) & (B) (McKinney 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-09.1(3)(a) & (b) 
(2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3604(C)(1) & (2) (2010); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512 
(West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-27(c)(1) & (2) (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-4 
(1) & (2) (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(2)(a)(i)(A) & (B) (West 2009); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 38.2-301(B)(1) & (2) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.030(3)(a) & (b) (2010); W. 
VA. CODE § 33-6-2(c)(1) & (2) (2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-102(c)(i) & (ii) (2009). 
 30. See generally ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(c) (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-
103(c)(1)(D)(i)(a) (2009); CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(c) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. § 
627.404(2)(b)(9) (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(d) (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 
123A(1) (2009). 
 31. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(e) (2008) (requiring that companies notify 
employees and their families before taking out insurance policies claimable as insurable 
interests); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1104(C)(4) (2009) (explaining that charities may 
claim an insurable interest in consenting donors); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103(c)(1) & (2) 
(2009) (determining that charities may claim an insurable interest in donors and companies 
may claim an insurable interest in employees for whom benefits are provided); CAL. INS. 
CODE § 10110.1(h) (West 2010) (allowing for charities to claim an insurable interest in 
consenting donors); FLA. STAT. ch. 627.404(2)(b)(7) & (8) (2009) (describing how charities 
and companies can derive an insurable interest in either charitable donors or employees in 
an employer‘s retirement plan); IOWA CODE § 511.39 (2009) (considering that charities may 
claim an insurable interest in donors); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-450(b) (2009) (discussing 
charities and insurable interests); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 123A(2) (2010) (explaining 
insurable interests in the realm of charities); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-201(5) (2009) 
(addressing insurable interests as they affect charities when insurance is purchased with 
insured individual‘s contributions); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-75 (2009) (determining that for 
non-key employees insurance coverage should be reasonably related to benefits provided 
employees in the aggregate); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-09.1(3)(d) & (e) (2009) 
(discussing insurable interests for charities and also for employees who receive benefits); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-704(4) (2009) (explaining insurable interests as they relate to 
charities); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-5 (2009) (discussing the manner in which charities 
may claim an insurable interest in donors); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-4(4) (2009) 
(addressing insurable interests and charities); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-301(b)(6) (2009) 
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By the twenty-first century, in response to the use of life insurance 
policies as securitized investment vehicles by strangers to the insureds, it 
was the insurance companies that were lobbying vigorously to have 
insurable interest requirements apply more widely.  One aspect of insurable 
interest rules that makes the companies‘ position more difficult is that most 
state statutes—and indeed common law relying on nineteenth century 
English common law
32
—require an insurable interest to exist at the time the 
life insurance policy first goes into effect, but it does not have to exist at 
the time the loss occurs.
33
  That rule allows a person to insure his or her 
 
(determining how charities may claim an insurable interest); WASH. REV. CODE § 
48.18.030(3)(d) (2010) (explaining insurable interests and their relationship to charities); W. 
VA. CODE § 33-6-2(c)(4) (2010) (discussing that charities may claim an insurable interest in 
their donors); Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, ―Janitors Insurance‖ Issue Leaves Workers 
in the Dark on Coverage, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2002, at C1 (discussing the ways companies 
administer life insurance policies to smooth earnings).  But see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 
123A(2) (2009) (stating that charitable institutions have unlimited insurable interest in the 
life of any donor without requiring specific consent); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3205(b)(3) (2010) 
(permitting a charitable institution to obtain life insurance on any person without requiring 
consent).  For a full discussion of this expansion of the meaning of insurable interest, see 
Susan Lorde Martin, Corporate-Owned Life Insurance: Another Financial Scheme That 
Takes Advantage of Employees and Shareholders, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 653 (2004). 
 32. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1876) (recounting 
the evolution of English common law toward the requirement that an interest in the insured 
exist at the time the insurance is effected, but need not continue until death). 
 33. See Lincoln Nat‘l Life Ins. v. Gordon R. A. Fishman Irrevocable Life Trust, 638 F. 
Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that California‘s Insurance Code provides that 
―an interest in the life or health of a person insured must exist when the insurance takes 
effect, but need not exist thereafter or when the loss occurs‖); Ficke v. Prudential Ins. Co., 
202 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ky. Ct. App. 1947) (noting the general rule that ―an insurable interest 
at the inception of a contract of life insurance is regarded by most courts as sufficient, and it 
is immaterial that such an interest ceases prior to the death of the insured‖).  See generally 
ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(f) (2009) (requiring that an insurable interest at the time a contract of 
personal insurance becomes effective, but need not exist at the time the loss occurs); CAL. 
INS. CODE § 10110.1(f) (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(h) (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40-453(a) (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3604(C)(4)(g) (2009).  The result of buying 
insurance on the life of someone in whom one does not have an insurable interest varies by 
state.  In some states the policy is void; the insurance company is not liable on the contract 
and may have to pay nothing or may just have to repay the premium payments.  See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(f)(2009) (stating that when a contract is voided because the benefits 
under the contract are not payable to a person with an insurable interest in the individual 
insured at the time the contract was made the insurer is liable only to repay the person who 
paid the premiums all premium payments without interest); CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(e) 
(West 2009) (stating that any ―device, scheme, or artifice designed to give the appearance of 
an insurable interest where there is no legitimate insurable interest violates the insurable 
interest laws‖); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:35-11 (West 2009) (stating that ―[a]ny assignment of 
the policy or certificate to a person having no insurable interest in the insured‘s life shall 
render the policy certificate void‖).  In other states, if one without an insurable interest in the 
life of the deceased receives the benefits of a life insurance policy, the executor or 
administrator of the estate of the deceased may sue to recover the benefits from the 
recipient.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.020(b) (2009) (stating that if a payee receives 
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own life, and then assign the policy to someone with no insurable interest 
in the insured.
34
  On the other hand, having an insurable interest may 
depend not only on having an interest in the continued life of the insured 
but, in some jurisdictions also in acting in good faith so that the policy is 
obtained not merely as a wager.
35
 
Some courts have held that good faith requires that the person insuring 
his or her own life has ―a genuine intent to obtain insurance protection for a 
family member, loved one, or business partner, rather than an intent to 
disguise what would otherwise be a gambling transaction by a stranger.‖
36
  
Other courts have held that an insured‘s intent in insuring his or her own 
life is ―legally irrelevant.‖
37
  Whether or not the good faith insurable 
interest existed has become a primary issue in current litigation about life 
insurance policies.
38
 
 C.  Life Insurance in the United States 
Current litigation is the result of the development of the life insurance 
industry in the United States as it has followed an incremental path to life 
policies as mere investment vehicles.  As in Europe, life insurance in the 
United States was an outgrowth of marine concerns.
39
  In the eighteenth 
century, ship captains began insuring themselves for four or five thousand 
 
benefits from a void contract, the ―person insured or the executive administrator of the 
person insured may maintain an action to recover the benefits from the person receiving 
them‖); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1104(B) (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103(b) 
(2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2704(b) (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-204(c) (2009); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1804(2) (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2404(2) (West 
2009); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3205(b)(4) (McKinney 2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3604(B) 
(2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 743.024(2) (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-27(b) 
(2009); WIS. STAT. § 631.07(4) (2009). 
 34. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155 (1911). 
 35. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 460-61. 
 36. Life Prod. Clearing, LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see 
also Finnie v. Walker, 257 F. 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1919) (explaining that the intent of the 
purchaser is important to determine validity of the policy); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Reiziz, 13 
F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D.N.Y. 1935) (noting that the insured must make the assignment in 
good faith). 
 37. Lincoln Nat‘l Life Ins. Co., 638 F. Supp. 2d at 1179. 
 38. Life Prod. Clearing, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 655-56. 
 39. See, e.g., THOMAS HARRISON MONTGOMERY, HISTORY OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF NORTH AMERICA OF PHILADELPHIA 72 (Phila., Press of Rev. Pub. and Printing Co. 1885) 
(detailing the emergence of life insurance for ship captains traveling to the West Indies); J. 
Owen Stalson, The Pioneer in American Life Insurance Marketing, 12 BULL. BUS. HIST. 
SOC‘Y 65 (Nov. 1938) (explaining the history of life insurance in the United States); Eric 
Wertheimer, Insurance in Colonial America, 7 COMMON-PLACE: INTERACTIVE J. EARLY AM. 
LIFE, pt. I (Oct. 2006), www.common-place.org/vol-07/no-01/wertheimer/ (explaining why 
marine insurance emerged before other forms of insurance in Colonial America). 
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dollars against capture by pirates.
40
  The first life insurance enterprises in 
the United States were started by religious groups to protect the wives and 
children of ministers.
41
  This humanitarian purpose, rather than gambling 
on lives, made life insurance a more moral and reputable and, therefore, 
more successful enterprise.
42
  At the time, in early and mid-nineteenth 
century, most life insurance was term insurance
43
 with no cash surrender 
value.
44
 
A significant change during that period was for insurance companies 
to offer term policies, not only for a defined period of time, but for the full 
term of the insured‘s life.
45
  The next big change occurred when life 
insurance companies expanded the financial services they offered.  By 
1830, the New York Life Insurance and Trust Company, founded by the 
directors of the Bank of New York, offered not only insurance for an 
individual‘s life or for a set term, but also accepted deposits and paid 
interest.
46
  In 1853, the Mutual Insurance Company of the City of New 
York started to offer, in addition to life insurance policies, deferred 
annuities.
47
  When the Manhattan Life Insurance Company of New York 
started in the early 1850s, the company clearly was intended as a profit-
making business that issued life insurance policies as only one of its 
services.
48
  It issued term policies, but it also had alternate plans.
49
  It had a 
―mutual‖ system, rather than a stockholder system, in which the beneficiary 
received not only the face amount of the policy, but also dividends that had 
accumulated.
50
  Under the mutual system, which insurance companies 
adopted because of their difficulty raising capital to form stock-issuing 
organizations, the owners of policies could borrow on the accumulated 
premiums and dividends, and the insurance company would deduct the 
borrowed amount from the pay-out received by the policy‘s beneficiary.
51
 
 
 40. MONTGOMERY, supra note 39. 
 41. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 28 (noting Presbyterians setting up a fund for the 
―Relief of Poor and Distressed Widows and Children‖ in 1759 and Episcopalians doing 
likewise in 1769). 
 42. Wertheimer, supra note 39, at pt. II. 
 43. A term life insurance policy provides only life coverage; there is no investment 
aspect.  If the insured dies within the term provided for, the beneficiary gets the face amount 
of the policy.  See, e.g., Term or Whole Life?, SMART MONEY, Sept. 29, 2000, 
http://www.smartmoney.com/personal-finance/insurance/term-or-whole-life-8011/# 
(comparing the relative benefits and drawbacks of term and whole life insurance policies). 
 44. JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. I, 189 
(M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 2002). 
 45. Stalson, supra note 39, at 66, 70. 
 46. MARKHAM, supra note 44, at 190. 
 47. Id. at 191. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 192. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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The next big change, a tontine-type of life insurance, was developed in 
the United States in the late 1800s.
52
  A tontine is an investment 
arrangement in which participants receive profits while they are alive, but 
their investments remain in the pool after their deaths to be divided up 
among those still alive at an agreed upon time or when an agreed upon 
number of participants remain.
53
  Tontine policies were invented by the 
founder of the AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company (then Equitable 
Life).
54
  In these ―deferred dividend‖ policies, the policy owner was entitled 
to a death benefit for a beneficiary, and, after the ―tontine period‖ of five to 
twenty years, the policy owner also received dividends that were based on 
his premiums and the premiums of any member of the pool who had died 
or who had stopped paying his premiums.
55
 
The New York legislature prohibited these and similar arrangements 
in 1906.
56
  These tontine policies were viewed much the way life insurance 
originally was viewed, as an unseemly form of gambling.  Some found it 
offensive to profit from the death or economic difficulties, as indicated by 
lapsed policies, of others.
57
  Furthermore, insurance companies were 
accused of dishonest behavior in using tontine funds for their own purposes 
and in misrepresenting what dividends would be.
58
 
After that period, the life insurance industry grew rapidly in response 
to urbanization and the breakdown of extended family ties, providing 
support to families whose breadwinners had died.
59
  In seeking increased 
profits, life insurance companies began offering a wide variety of products 
that would give people not only a method for managing the economic risks 
of death, but also an easy way to invest and save.
60
 
The pure insurance product is term insurance.  Many financial 
advisors recommend term life insurance as the best product to protect 
against economic difficulties in the event of the family breadwinner‘s 
death.
61
  If the insured does not die by the expiration of the term and the 
 
 52. Kent McKeever, A Short History of Tontines, FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 507 
(2010). 
 53. Id. at 491. 
 54. Id. at 507. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (citing 1906 N.Y. Laws 763). 
 57. Id. at 508. 
 58. Id. at 509. 
 59. Roberta M. Berry, The Human Genome Project and the End of Insurance, 7 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 205, 213 (1996). 
 60. Id. at 216, 222. 
 61. See, e.g., Suze Orman, Suze Orman‘s What-If Policy, O, THE OPRAH MAG., Jan. 
2004, at 27, available at http://www.oprah.com/money/Suze-Ormans-What-If-Policy 
(―[T]he only type of life insurance that makes sense is term.‖); Term or Whole Life?, SMART 
MONEY, Sept. 29, 2000 (updated online Sept. 10, 2008), 
http://www.smartmoney.com/personal-finance/insurance/term-or-whole-life-8011/ (―For 
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policy is not renewed for another term, the policy no longer has any value.  
The advantage of a term policy is that it is much less expensive than other 
kinds of policies; therefore, it is often recommended for young people and 
people with limited budgets.
62
 
A whole life insurance policy provides a death benefit to the 
beneficiary when the insured dies, but it also includes a savings plan.
63
  
Critics complain that because of high front-end sales loads (perhaps eighty 
percent of the first-year premium, for example), the savings, or cash value, 
in the early years of a whole life policy are so low that most people are 
better off buying term insurance for much less money and investing the rest 
themselves.
64
  An advantage of whole life is that the growth of its cash 
value is tax deferred.
65
  Universal life insurance is whole life with more 
variables and consequently greater cost.  The policyholder can have a 
variable death benefit, premium, payment schedule, and withdrawal from 
cash value.
66
 
One critic explains that in 2006, the annual premium for one million 
dollars of twenty-year term insurance for a healthy forty-five-year-old non-
smoking man was about $1,400; whereas, his annual premium for a 
universal life policy would be $8,000 for the rest of his life.
67
  On the other 
hand, a forty-year-old man buying a one-million-dollar twenty-year whole 
life policy today would pay annual premiums of $17,750, but at the end of 
twenty years, his policy would have a cash value of $518,068 for an 
 
most people, the right type of insurance can be summed up in a single word: term.‖); 
BudgetLife.com, Is Whole Life Insurance a Good Investment?, 
http://www.budgetlife.com/life_insurance_investment.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2009) 
(―The advice for most people is still to use term insurance for most situations.‖); 
J.D.Power.com, J.D. Power, The Benefits of Term Life Insurance, http:// 
www.jdpower.com/insurance/articles/The-Benefits-Of-Term-Life-Insurance (last visited 
Jan. 2010) (listing some of the advantages of term life insurance against whole life 
insurance); Jeffrey D. Voudrie, Guarding Your Wealth for Senior Citizens: Beware of 
Universal Life Insurance: Part 2 (Aug. 17, 2006), 
http://seniorjournal.com/NEWS/GuardWealth/6-08-17-BewareofUniversalLife-2.htm 
(―Term insurance allows you to purchase the life insurance you need at a lower cost, while 
giving you the flexibility and control over your investments.‖).  Advice may differ for 
wealthy people who can use other types of life insurance policies in estate planning.  See, 
e.g., BudgetLife.com, supra note 61 (recommending that wealthy individuals allocate up to 
ten percent of their portfolios in life insurance); Term or Whole Life?, supra (advising 
individuals to calculate a whole life policy‘s internal rate of return and to expect to hold the 
policy for at least twenty years). 
 62. Leslie Scism, Whole-Life Insurance, Long Derided, Gets New Lease, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 27-28, 2010, at B8. 
 63. Douglas R. Richmond, Liability Issues in the Sale of Life Insurance, 40 TORT TRIAL 
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 877, 879 (2005). 
 64. Id. at 279-81; Orman, supra note 61. 
 65. Richmond, supra note 63, at 880. 
 66. Id. at 881. 
 67. Voudrie, supra note 61. 
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annualized return of 3.8 percent.
68
  During the 2008-2009 financial 
meltdown, whole life and universal life were good savings vehicles because 
of their conservative investment strategies but only if the policy owners 
held their policies for a significant length of time.
69
  A forty-year-old policy 
owner, for example, would not have his cash value equal the premiums he 
had paid until the twelfth year.
70
 
To these products, insurance companies have added variable life 
policies and variable universal life policies, which employ the 
characteristics of life and universal life policies, respectively, but allow the 
policy owner to invest premiums in mutual-fund-type accounts that are 
securities offered by prospectus.
71
  With these policies, the death benefit, or 
part of it, may or may not be guaranteed but depends instead on the success 
of the investment portion.
72
 
In the 1980s, insurance companies began vigorously marketing 
corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) and bank-owned life insurance 
(BOLI) for organizations to insure the lives of rank-and-file employees and 
to be named as the beneficiaries on these policies for people whose deaths 
would have no appreciable effect on the business.
73
  Charities extended this 
idea by purchasing policies on the lives of wealthy patrons.
74
  These 
policies made a lot of money for the insurance companies, corporations, 
banks, and charities.
75
 
 This brief background indicates that life insurance has transformed 
from being a wager, to being protection for widows and orphans in the 
event the death of the head of the household, to being a savings and 
investment plan with some death risk management, to being merely another 
financial investment product. 
III. VIATICAL AND LIFE SETTLEMENTS 
 A.  History 
A viatical settlement added a new financial arrangement to the 
concept of life insurance.  The term derives from ―viaticum,‖ used in 
ancient Rome to describe a purse that contained money and provisions for a 
trip.
76
  The idea of a viatical settlement was created in response to the AIDS 
 
 68. Scism, supra note 62. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Richmond, supra note 63, at 882. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See generally Martin, supra note 31, at 653-54 (arguing that third parties should not 
be allowed to insure a person without the consent of the insured). 
 74. Id. at 657-58. 
 75. Id. at 670-74. 
 76. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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epidemic in the 1980s.
77
  A viatical settlement allowed HIV/AIDS sufferers 
to receive money from their life insurance policies to pay current medical 
and living expenses.
78
  The insured, terminally-ill owner of a life insurance 
policy would sell the policy to a third party for a cash settlement.
79
  The 
new owner would pay the premiums on the policy until the insured died 
and then would receive the face value of the policy.
80
  A viatical settlement 
provided a good deal for the insured who could no longer work, had high 
medical expenses, and could no longer afford life insurance policy 
premiums.
81
  Furthermore, in 1996 Congress amended the tax code so that 
terminally or chronically ill people who sold their life insurance policies to 
viatical settlement companies would not have to pay income tax on the 
proceeds of the sales as long as the purchasing companies were licensed in 
the states in which the sellers resided.
82
  It also benefitted the third party 
because, in the early days, AIDS patients generally died within months of 
being diagnosed.
83
  By the mid-1990s there were about sixty companies in 
the viatical settlement business.
84
 
The viatical settlement industry was dealt a severe blow when AIDS 
became increasingly treatable, sufferers began living longer, and the threat 
of a cure arose.
85
  These companies began pursuing life insurance policies 
of people with other terminal illnesses like cancer, Lou Gehrig‘s disease, 
 
 77. Id.; Kelly J. Bozanic, Comment, An Investment to Die for: From Life Insurance to 
Death Bonds, the Evolution and Legality of the Life Settlement Industry, 113 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. 229, 233 (2008); Eryn Mathews, Notes and Commentaries, STOLI on the Rocks: Why 
States Should Eliminate the Abusive Practice of Stranger-Owned Life Insurance, 14 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 521, 523 (2008). 
 78. Marlene Y. Satter, Bonds. Death Bonds, INVESTMENT ADVISOR, Nov. 2009, at 115. 
 79. Bozanic, supra note 77, at 233-34. 
 80. Id. at 234. 
 81. A typical settlement was seventy percent of the face value of the policy.  Carl T. 
Hall, Viatical Firm‘s Stock Hit Hard, S.F. CHRON., July 18, 1996, at C1.  Typically, a life 
expectancy of less than six months would lead to a cash offer of about eighty percent of the 
face value of the policy; a life expectancy of two years or more, no more than fifty percent 
of face value.  David W. Dunlap, AIDS Drugs Alter an Industry‘s Math:  Recalculating 
Death-Benefit Deals, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1996, at D4. 
 82. 26 U.S.C. § 101(g)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2000). 
 83. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2007).  A typical 
investor could expect to receive a return of about fifteen percent, but if the insured lived 
longer than expected, the return could decrease precipitously.  Dunlap, supra note 81, at D4. 
 84. Dunlap, supra note 81, at D4. 
 85. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 81, at C1 (reporting on the collapse of Dignity Partners, 
Inc., one of best known viatical settlement companies, whose stock went down from 4 11/16 
to 1 3/8 after an announcement that it would no longer buy life insurance policies from 
people with AIDS); see also Life Partners, 484 F.3d at 287-88 (noting the expansion of 
viatical settlements industry to other terminal illnesses when AIDS became a chronic 
disease).  Viatical settlement companies remaining in business reduced the amount they 
would pay for policies of AIDS sufferers.  Hall, supra note 81, at C1; Dunlap, supra note 
81, at D1 (noting that prices paid to AIDS patients for their policies fell five to ten percent). 
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Alzheimer‘s, and advanced heart disease.
86
  Once again the industry was 
growing.  Experts estimate that $5 million worth of life insurance policies 
were sold to third party investors in 1989, and that $200 million worth of 
policies were sold in 1998.
87
  That success encouraged the industry to 
expand by offering to buy the policies of seniors who were not necessarily 
terminally ill.  Today, the industry has bought such policies worth about 
$20 billion.
88
  Shifting from terminally-ill insureds to people who just 
wanted to cash out their policies, and in an attempt to reduce the ―ghoulish‖ 
nature of a business whose success depends on the early demise of 
insureds, the industry changed its name and description from ―viatical 
settlements‖ to ―life settlements.‖
89
  Among other changes in the industry 
were the life expectancies of the insureds which grew from under two years 
to an average of eleven or twelve years while the size of the policies grew 
from an average of $80,000 in the viatical market to over $1 million in the 
life settlement market.
90
 
The original life settlement arrangement involved a broker who would 
seek out policyholders in their sixties, seventies, and eighties, whose 
spouses had financial resources other than existing insurance policies, 
whose children were grown and self-supporting, and whose annual 
insurance premiums were large, perhaps $6,000 for a $100,000 policy or 
$77,000 for a $3,800,000 policy.
91
  If the policyholders just stopped paying 
the premiums on their term policies, they would get nothing.  The broker 
would find a purchaser who would agree to take over the premium 
payments and pay the policyholder between six and forty percent of the 
policy‘s face value, in exchange for receiving the death benefit when the 
insured died.
92
  Obviously, the sooner the insured died, the greater the 
return for the purchaser.  Among the purchasers willing to spend billions on 
such policies were hedge funds, large financial institutions like Credit 
 
 86. Dunlap, supra note 81, at D1. 
 87. Life Partners, 484 F.3d at 288. 
 88. Benjamin Popper, They Bet Your Life . . . Literally, ABC NEWS, June 23, 2009 (on 
file with author). 
 89. See Sachin Kohli, Comment, Pricing Death: Analyzing the Secondary Market for 
Life Insurance Policies and its Regulatory Environment, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 279, 281, 297-99 
(2006) (explaining the shift in the market from short-term viatical settlements to more long-
term life settlements). 
 90. A.M. BEST METHODOLOGY, LIFE SETTLEMENT SECURITIZATION, Nov. 24, 2009, at 1, 
available at http://www.ambest.com/debt/lifesettlement.pdf. 
 91. Joseph B. Treaster, Death Benefits, Now for The Living, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1998, 
at BU1. 
 92. See Jennifer Hodson, Life-Settlements Industry Sees Growth, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 
2009 (estimating industry payouts ranging from ten percent to twenty-nine percent of death 
benefit with average of twenty-four percent across all policy types); Treaster, supra note 91, 
at BU14. 
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Suisse and Deutsche Bank, and investors like Warren Buffett.
93
 
Today, anyone wanting to sell the rights to the death benefit in an 
insurance policy can go online and find hundreds of companies that will 
―turn that old policy into cash.‖
94
  Cantor Fitzgerald, an international 
financial services company, operates an electronic marketplace for life 
settlements that allows life insurance policy owners to list policies for sale 
and investors to bid on and buy listed policies.
95 
 B. STOLIs 
The business of life settlements has evolved from having investors 
purchase existing life insurance policies from insureds who no longer need 
the insurance to protect their families in the event of their deaths, to an 
arrangement in which a life insurance agent or a life settlement broker 
persuades a senior citizen
96
 (preferably one with a net worth of at least $5 
million)
97
 to take out a life insurance policy, not for the purpose of 
protecting his or her family, but for a current financial benefit.
98
  These 
arrangements have been dubbed stranger-originated life insurance 
(STOLI).
99
 
The insured may be lured to participate by the promise of two years of 
free insurance,
100
 gifts of a car or a trip or cash,
101
 and the promise of a 
 
 93. Charles Duhigg, Late in Life, Finding a Bonanza in Life Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 2006, at 1. 
 94. See generally Learn Life Settlements, http://www.learnlifesettlements.com/ (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2010); Open Life Settlements, 
http://www.openlifesettlements.com/your_eligibility.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2010); 
Patriot Settlement, http://patriotsettlement.reachlocal.net/index.php (last visited Sept. 21, 
2010); Policy Options, http://www.mypolicyoptions.com/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2010); 
Woodbridge Structured Funding, LLC, http://woodbridgeinvestments.com/sell-life-
insurance-policy (last visited Sept. 21, 2010). 
 95. Letter from Stuart Hersch, President & CEO, Cantor LifeMarkets, a unit of Cantor 
Fitzgerald LP, to Bernie Stoffel, Office of Ins. Regulation, Florida Dep‘t of Fin. Servs., 
(Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.floir.com/pdf/CantorFitzgerald.pdf. 
 96. Typically, it is a person between seventy and eighty-five.  Stephan Leimberg, 
Stranger Originated Life Insurance (STOLI):  What Counsel (and What Every Advisor) 
Must Absolutely Positively Know!, SP037 A.L.I-A.B.A 573, 576 (2009). 
 97. R. Marshall Jones et al., ‗Free‘ Life Insurance: Risks and Costs of Non-Recourse 
Premium Financing, ESTATE PLANNING, July 2006, at 2. 
 98. See Popper, supra note 88 (explaining why people invest in these policies). 
 99. Popper, supra note 88.  These arrangements are also called stranger-owned life 
insurance (STOLI) or (SOLI), J. Alan Jensen & Stephan R. Leimberg, Stranger-Owned Life 
Insurance: A Point/Counterpoint Discussion, 33 ACTEC J. 110, 110 (Fall 2007); investor-
owned life insurance (IOLI), Memorandum from Ed Cassidy, President of Travelers Life 
Div., et al. to Travelers Life & Annuity Agents (Apr. 18, 2005), 
http://www.lisassociation.org/vlsaamembers/files/ICP_E_investor_initiated_IOLI_and_SOL
I.pdf; and speculator-initiated life insurance (SPINLIFE), Charles Duhigg, supra note 91. 
 100. Leimberg, supra note 96, at 576. 
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substantial profit on the sure sale of the policy.
102
  Typically, the broker or 
agent, under an arrangement with a life settlement company, will solicit a 
senior to purchase a life insurance policy with a high face value, with the 
company lending him the money to pay the premiums for two years, or 
whatever term state law sets as the period during which a claim can be 
contested by the insurance carrier.
103
  It is common for the insured to set up 
an insurance trust naming his spouse or other loved one as the trust 
beneficiary.
104
  If the insured dies within that period, his spouse, as 
beneficiary of the insurance trust, will get the death benefit (the free 
insurance), pay back the loan plus interest from the proceeds,
105
 and often 
pay the broker up to fifty percent of the benefit received.
106
  If the insured 
lives beyond two years or the contestability period, then the life settlement 
company buys the beneficial interest in the insurance trust, paying the 
insured a lump sum percent of the face value of the policy, usually between 
ten and thirty percent, and the agent will get a commission of about ten 
percent or more of the purchase price.
107
  The life settlement company or its 
investors will continue to pay the premiums on the policy, and when the 
insured dies, they will get the death benefit.
108
  Clearly, the sooner the 
insured dies, the greater the company‘s profit. 
The legal problem with this arrangement is that the actual party for 
whom the policy is purchased, the life settlement company, has no 
insurable interest in the life of the insured and, therefore, it is against public 
policy designed to prohibit wagering on the lives of others and in violation 
of statutes in most states.
109 
 C.  The Life Settlement Industry 
Faced with the problems of benefitting from the early death of 
strangers, threatening the financial structure of powerful insurance 
companies, and violating or coming very close to violating the law, the life 
settlement industry has been working hard to justify its existence.
110
  It can 
 
 101. Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 99, at 116. 
 102. Leimberg, supra note 96, at 576. 
 103. See, e.g., Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. v. Bernstein, 2009 WL 1912468, at *2 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. June 29, 2009) (stating the contestability period of the policy at issue). 
 104. Id. at *3. 
 105. Charles Duhigg, Late in Life, Finding a Bonanza in Life Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 2006, at 46. 
 106. Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 99, at 110, 111. 
 107. Lincoln Life, 2009 WL 1912468, at *3. 
 108. Late in Life, supra note 105. 
 109. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 110. See, e.g., Formal Written Submission of Doug Head, Executive Dir. of Life Ins. 
Settlement Assoc. (LISA), to the Fla. Office of Ins. Regulation Informational Hearing (Sept. 
3, 2008), http://www.floir.com/pdf/LifeInsSettlementAssoc.pdf (advocating for the life 
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afford to do that because by 2008 it was a $16 billion industry
111
 with 
estimates of becoming a $21 billion industry by 2012 as more senior 
citizens become aware of the option of selling life insurance policies that 
they no longer need.
112
  Its prospects are also increased by the fact that life 
insurance companies are selling more policies than ever.  In 2009, New 
York Life announced for the first time that its agents had sold term and 
permanent life insurance policies with over $1 billion in premiums.
113
  State 
Farm‘s life insurance affiliates added $24 billion of life insurance policies 
bringing the total in force to $737 billion at the end of 2009.
114
 
In 2008, the executive director of the life settlement industry‘s 
national trade organization testified to the Florida Office of Insurance 
Regulation that the ―secondary market for life insurance has brought great 
benefits to consumers, unlocking the value of life insurance policies.‖
115
  
He asserted that the industry is opposed to STOLI, but emphasized that 
merely because someone buys a life insurance policy and assigns it to a 
third party, one cannot assume the buyer was participating in a STOLI 
scheme by making a straw purchase for the third party.
116
  That is important 
to the industry because although stranger-originated policies are illegal, 
stranger-owned policies are not.
117
  He cited the fundamental right of the 
alienability of property as applying to policyholders.
118
  Policyholders may 
not buy a policy for the benefit of a third party without an insurable interest 
in the insured, but as soon as they own the policy they may assign it to that 
third party.  That is the crux of the industry‘s argument and the issue in 
many lawsuits. 
One area where the life settlement industry has been having some 
success in its battle with life insurance companies is in getting states to 
require life insurance companies to inform policy purchasers that life 
settlements are a possibility.  In Kentucky, the General Assembly passed a 
bill in March 2010 that requires life insurance companies to notify owners 
of life insurance policies who are sixty or older or who are terminally ill 
 
settlement industry). 
 111. Securitization of Life Insurance Settlements: Hearing Before Comm. on House Fin. 
Serv. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins. & Gov‘t Sponsored Enterprises, 111th Cong. app. 
at 53 (2009) (statement of Paula Dubberly, Associate Director, Div. of Corporation Finance, 
SEC). 
 112. Hodson, supra note 92. 
 113. New York Life Sets New Record for U.S. Life Insurance Sales in 2009, Achieving $1 
Billion in Agent-Sold Premium for the First Time, INS. NEWS NET, Mar. 4, 2010, 
http://insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?id=168754. 
 114. Press Release, State Farm, State Farm Financial Results Improve (Feb. 26, 2010), 
http://www.statefarm.com/about/media/media_releases/20100226.asp. 
 115. Formal Written Submission of Doug Head, supra note 110, at 1. 
 116. Id. at 2. 
 117. Id. at 4. 
 118. Id. at 3, 6, 7, 12. 
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and requesting to surrender a policy, 1) ―that life insurance is a critical part 
of a broader financial plan;‖ 2) that there are ―alternatives to lapse or 
surrender of the policy;‖ and 3) what life settlements are and that they ―are 
a regulated transaction in Kentucky.‖
119
  Similar notification requirements 
exist in Maine, Oregon, and Washington.
120
 
The life settlement industry rightly points out the disingenuous quality 
of life insurance companies‘ assertions that the full value of life insurance 
policies is their death benefit.
121
  While this may be true for term insurance, 
it is certainly not true of whole life and universal life products which 
insurance carriers market very vigorously and from which they make very 
large profits.
122
  In fact, the life insurance industry contributed to the 
emergence of the life settlement industry by offering very low surrender 
value payments to people.  One life settlement company claims that, on 
average, it has paid policy owners about ten times the surrender value 
offered by the issuing insurance company when the policy owner wanted to 
stop paying premiums.
123
  One trade association reports that the average 
settlement is four to six times the surrender value.
124
 
The life insurance industry argues that its surrender value schedule 
and the fact that policyholders allow thirty-eight percent of all policies to 
lapse (receiving no death benefit)
125
 permit life insurance companies to 
keep premiums as low as they are.
126
  Life settlement arrangements mean 
 
 119. H.B. 126, 2010 Sess. (Ky. 2010). 
 120. Lori Widmer, Life Settlement Regulations Make It Harder to Avoid the Market, 
AGENT‘S SALES J., Feb. 24, 2010, available at 
http://www.asjonline.com/Issues/2010/3/Pages/Life-Settlement-Regulations.aspx; see also, 
e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6806-A(2) (West 2009). 
 121. See, e.g., Formal Written Submission of Doug Head, supra note 110, at 13 (quoting 
from memorandum submitted to Maine Bureau of Insurance by American Council of Life 
Insurers (ACLI), which Head alleges is ―an attempt to confuse legislators‖ and a 
―demonstrably false and misleading attempt to misrepresent the very essence of the product 
promoted by all the insurers, the ACLI‘s membership‖). 
 122. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. 
 123. Securitization of Life Insurance Settlements: Hearings Before Comm. on House Fin. 
Serv. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins. & Gov‘t Sponsored Enterprises, 111th Cong. 68-
69 (2009) (testimony of Kurt Gearhart on behalf of Credit Suisse). 
 124. Securitization of Life Insurance Settlements: Hearings Before Comm. on House Fin. 
Serv. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins. & Gov‘t Sponsored Enterprises, 111th Cong. 43 
(2009) (statement of Russel Dorsett, President, Life Insurance Settlement Association). 
 125. That is the figure for 2008.  ACLI Life Insurers Fact Book 2009, Dec. 8, 2009, at 
69, http://www.acli.com/ACLI/Tools/Industry+Facts/Life+Insurers+Fact+Book/GR09-
+215.htm. 
 126. According to LIMRA International, a worldwide association of insurance and 
financial services companies, 12.7% of whole life insurance policies lapse in the first year 
(when the annual rate of return is -100%); 8.1% lapse in the second year (when the annual 
rate of return is -97.4%); and another 5.5% lapse in the third year (when the annual rate of 
return is -19%).  Cash Value in Life Insurance: What‘s It Worth to You?, INSURE.COM, May 
7, 2008, http://www.insure.com/articles/lifeinsurance/cash-value.html. 
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that policies will not lapse, so insurance carriers will pay death benefits on 
many more policies than they would be paying otherwise.
127
  This will 
result in higher premiums for everyone, including those who want only the 
death risk coverage.
128
  That argument is somewhat reminiscent of the 
tontine arrangement.  Those who can afford to keep paying the premiums 
the longest do best because they benefit from the lapsing of others. 
The life insurance companies could combat the negative impact of the 
life settlement industry by getting into the life settlements business itself—
a possibility it has forcefully rejected by declaring, once again rather 
disingenuously, that ―a settlement fractures the insurer‘s relationship with 
its insured.‖
129
  The companies have not clarified why a lapse is not 
similarly ―fracturing‖ to the relationship.  In arguing before state insurance 
agencies for additional regulation of the life settlement industry, they assert 
that the real value of a life insurance policy is the insureds‘ knowing that 
their beneficiaries ―will receive the protection and comfort of the policy 
death benefit.‖
130
  That would be true if all life insurance were term 
insurance, entirely separate from savings and investments. 
IV. SECURITIZATION OF LIFE SETTLEMENTS 
With increasing customers, both as policy sellers and as investors, and 
growing resources, the life settlement industry has actively asserted that its 
property rights argument trumps the insurable interest argument of the life 
insurance companies.
131
  The industry‘s success is encouraging bankers to 
create new investment opportunities by securitizing life settlements.
132
  The 
industry foresees huge potential for such investment products because there 
are about $26 trillion in life insurance policies in force today.
133
 
 
 127. Marlene Y. Satter, Insurance Update: Bonds. Death Bonds., INVESTMENT ADVISOR, 
Nov. 1, 2009, at 115, available at 
http://www.investmentadvisor.com/Issues/2009/November-2009/Pages/Bonds-Death-
Bonds.aspx. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Letter from Michael J. Bartholomew representing the American Council of Life 
Insurers (ACLI) to Thomas M. Record, Senior Staff Attorney for Maine Bureau of 
Insurance, Aug. 14, 2008, at 5. 
 130. Id. at 6. 
 131. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. 
 132. Securitization of Life Insurance Settlements: Hearings Before Comm. on House Fin. 
Serv. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins. & Gov‘t Sponsored Enterprises, 111th Cong. 97 
(2009) (statement of Susan E. Voss, Vice-Pres., Nat‘l Assoc. of Ins. Commrs. and Comm‘r 
of Iowa Ins. Comm‘n). 
 133. Jenny Anderson, New Exotic Investments Emerging on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2009, at 1, 24; Arnaud de Borchgrave, Unraveling at the Seams – Gloom and Doom 
and Moore Is Less, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2009, at A17; Satter, supra note 127. 
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 A.  Securitization Background 
Securitization changes receivables like home mortgage loans or life 
insurance death benefits into securities that can be sold in capital 
markets.
134
  The securitization idea began to take hold in the 1960s and 
1970s when banks, in order to diversify their portfolios, began selling some 
of their mortgage loans to investors who could make a profit without being 
in the business of originating mortgage loans.
135
  Instead of selling the loans 
individually, bankers realized that if they packaged many loans together 
they could spread the risk of any defaults over the entire package.
136
  The 
next step for the bankers was issuing securities—such as bonds—backed 
by the cash flow from the loan-package mortgage payments; they thus 
made money not only from the mortgage payments, but also from the sale 
of the securities they had created.
137
  Next in the securitization scheme was 
dividing the securities into bundles with different levels of risk and return 
(―tranches‖) so that defaults on the underlying mortgages would be charged 
first against the level with the highest risk and highest return; those buying 
the level with the lowest risk and lowest return would probably never suffer 
any losses because it was highly unlikely that so many defaults would 
happen at the same time (or so they thought).
138
  The final step was the 
invention of special purpose vehicles (SPVs), shell companies created to 
buy the packages of mortgages and to sell the securities.
139
  Finally, in the 
1980s, bankers came up with a new big idea:  taking the mortgage 
securitization and SPV concept and applying it to a pool of contracts that 
insured against defaults on corporate bonds and loans (credit 
derivatives).
140
 
 B.  Securitizing Life Settlements 
After the collapse of the subprime mortgage-backed security business 
in 2008, bankers were looking for another new big idea for making money 
and came up with a plan to securitize life settlements.
141
  Bankers would 
 
 134. Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1656 (2004). 
 135. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL‘S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED CATASTROPHE 52 
(2009). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 52-53. 
 139. Id. at 54. 
 140. Id. at 53. 
 141. Jenny Anderson, New Exotic Investments Emerging on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2009, at 1. 
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bundle hundreds or thousands of life insurance policies together into bonds 
just as they did with mortgages, and sell the bonds to investors such as 
pension funds.
142
  When the insureds die, the investors receive the death 
benefits.  If the insureds die soon, the return can be high; if they live long, 
investors may even have to take a loss.
143
  In any case, the bankers will 
make a profit from the fees for creating, reselling, and trading the bonds.
144
 
Credit Suisse bought a life settlement company and created a group 
dedicated to buying, packaging, and reselling large numbers of life 
insurance policies.
145
  Nevertheless, in September 2009, a Credit Suisse 
spokesperson testified before a congressional subcommittee that, while 
Credit Suisse is active in the life settlement business and in insurance 
securitizations, it had never done life settlement securitizations, though it 
would not rule out doing them in the future.
146
  Credit Suisse does, 
however, sell portfolios of policies to institutional investors such as 
insurance companies, fund managers, and pension funds.
147
 
In 2006 Goldman Sachs created its Longmore Capital unit to handle 
life settlements,
148
 and in 2008 it created its QxX mortality index which 
tracked the mortality of 46,000 people over sixty-five with diseases other 
than AIDS to provide information to institutional investors who were going 
to buy its life settlement securities.
149
  But, in December 2009, it began to 
wind down Longmore, and the following month it shut down its QxX 
index.
150
  Goldman claimed its exit from the life settlements business was a 
commercial decision based on its assessment that the industry was not 
going to grow the way Goldman had thought, but some analysts believe 
that Goldman did not want to antagonize life insurance carriers with large 
stock and bond portfolios.
151
  A managing director at Goldman testified 
before Congress in September 2009 that Goldman had never executed a life 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 24. 
 146. Securitization of Life Insurance Settlements: Hearings Before Comm. on House Fin. 
Serv. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins. & Gov‘t Sponsored Enterprises, 111th Cong. 63 
(2009) (statement of Kurt Gearhart on behalf of Credit Suisse). 
 147. Id. at 6. 
 148. Darla Mercado, Goldman Abandoning Life Settlements Market, 
CRAIN‘SNEWYORK.COM, Jan. 29, 2010, 
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20100129/FREE/100129856. 
 149. Christian Evulich, Life Settlement Industry Shaken by Goldman Sachs Departure, 
TECHNORATI.COM, Feb. 3, 2010, http://technorati.com/business/finance/article/life-
settlement-industry-shaken-by-goldman/. 
 150. Mercado, supra note 148. 
 151. Ed Leefeldt, Life (Settlements) Isn‘t Good for Goldman Sachs, BNET.COM, Feb. 6, 
2010, http://industry.bnet.com/financial-services/10006672/life-settlements-isnt-good-for-
goldman-sachs/. 
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settlement securitization and had no plans to do so.
152
 
Credit rating agencies are interested in participating in this new 
scheme because they receive fees for rating life settlement securities.
153
  In 
2008, DBRS Ltd., a little-known Toronto-based credit rating agency, 
became the first rating agency to issue criteria for rating life settlement 
contracts.
154
  DBRS figured that if a bond is made up of policies of insureds 
who have different diseases, the value of the bond would not fall 
precipitously if a cure was found for one of them.
155
  It is also important for 
there to be a mix of insurance companies for each bond to decrease the risk 
associated with company failure.
156
  DBRS recommends that no insurance 
company writing policies in a securitized pool should be responsible for 
more than twenty percent of the pool‘s total face amount.
157
 
This whole arrangement sounds remarkably like the one that gave rise 
to the subprime mortgage loan debacle.
158
  Nevertheless, investors are still 
interested because they view life insurance policies as an investment that is 
not correlated with other economic indicators and, therefore, as one that 
spreads investors‘ risk.
159
  Success as an investor in life insurance policies 
does not depend on the usual micro or macroeconomic variables—like 
corporate earnings or interest rates, respectively—but rather on 
demographics such as the age and health of the insureds.
160
 
 
 152. Securitization of Life Insurance Settlements: Hearings Before Comm. on House Fin. 
Serv. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins. & Gov‘t Sponsored Enterprises, 111th Cong. 92 
(2009) (statement of Steven H. Strongin on behalf of Goldman Sachs). 
 153. Anderson, supra note 141, at 24. 
 154. David Parkinson, Grave Concerns Over Rise of Death Bonds, GLOBE & MAIL 
(Toronto), Oct. 16, 2009, at B1. 
 155. Anderson, supra note 141, at 24.  A.M. Best has created a ―disease diversity‖ table 
that sets maximum limits on the percent of insureds with policies in a securitization pool 
who can have particular diseases.  For example, only 50% should have cardiovascular 
disease; 25% cancer; and 10% diabetes.  A.M. BEST, LIFE SETTLEMENT SECURITIZATION, 6 
(Nov. 24, 2009). 
 156. Anderson, supra note 141, at 24. 
 157. DBRS, Rating U.S. Life Settlement Securitizations, at 7 (Feb. 2008), available at 
http://www.dbrs.com/research/218569/rating-u-s-life-settlement-securitizations.pdf. 
 158. Bill Weir, The Business of Life Insurance: Betting on Your Own Mortality, ABC 
NEWS, Oct. 5, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/life-insurance-securitization-wall-
street-bet-life-expectancy/story?id=8757456&page=1. 
 159. Anderson, supra note 141, at 24; Jim Connolly, Few Deals, Much Interest, INS. 
BELLWETHER, Oct. 18, 2009, http://www.theinsurancebellwether.com/2009/10/few-deals-
much-interest.html.  But see Trevor Thomas, Life Settlement Securitizations Leave S&P 
Cold, NAT‘L UNDERWRITER, Oct. 15, 2009, 
http://www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com/News/2009/10/Pages/Life-Settlement-
Securitizations-Leave-SP-Cold.aspx (noting that there is correlation between the condition 
of the economy and the credit quality of insurance carriers). 
 160. Life Settlements: Hedge Funds Turning to Life Settlements for Absolute, 
Uncorrelated Returns, HEDGE FUND L. REP., Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.hflawreport.com 
(click on ―Archive‖). 
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On the other hand, Standard & Poor‘s (S&P), another credit rating 
agency, has reported several risks associated with these transactions.
161
  
First, according to the S&P report, statistics about the insureds are unlikely 
to be sufficiently credible with a pool of fewer than a thousand lives, and 
many factors about the insureds would have to be considered, including 
age, gender, smoker or non-smoker, genetic information, occupational 
history, and living environment.
162
  Second, it would have to be ascertained 
that coverage under the policies could not be denied by the insurance 
carriers because of a lack of insurable interest.
163
  A third problem is the 
inaccuracy of independent medical reviews.
164
  A comparison of life 
expectancies issued by three different medical examiners on the same lives 
found differences of between eight and twenty-four months.
165
  If there is a 
twenty-four-month ―mistake,‖ the return to investors can go from 12.4% to 
6.5%, cutting the rate of return almost in half.
166
  A fourth problem is the 
possibility of not being able to verify the death of an insured, resulting in a 
long period of delay before the death benefit is paid.
167
  S&P has concluded 
that because of these inherent risks, it would not be rating life settlement 
securitizations in the foreseeable future.
168
 
From the position of the insured, a positive outcome of securitization 
is that it could raise the amount that the insured would receive for a policy, 
but that would depend on how much was taken by brokers, agents, 
originators, and any others involved in the transaction.
169
  There is also 
always the issue of whether the insured has had all the ramifications of the 
arrangement explained adequately and accurately.
170
 
A spokesperson for A.M. Best, another well-known credit rating 
agency, has said that, in fact, very few life insurance securitizations will 
take place because the originator of the security would need so much 
 
 161. Connolly, supra note 159. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.; see also DBRS, supra note 157, at 4 (noting origination risks in addition to 
insurable interest problems:  improprieties committed by brokers selling insurance policies 
or by life settlement companies buying insurance policies). 
 164. Connolly, supra note 159; see DBRS, supra note 157, at 5 (noting that multiple, 
independent medical underwriters should be used in order to minimize the risk of inaccurate 
life expectancy calculations). 
 165. Meg Green, AIG Files First Rated Life Settlement Securitization, 
TRADINGMARKETS, Apr. 16, 2009,  
http://www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/news/Stock%20News/2275566/. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Connolly, supra note 159. 
 168. Thomas, supra note 159. 
 169. Recent Innovations in Securitization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital 
Markets, Ins., & Gov‘t Sponsored Enterprises of the Comm. on H. Fin. Services,  111th 
Cong. 95 (2009) (prepared statement of Steven H. Strongin, Managing Director and Head of 
Global Investment Research, Goldman, Sachs & Co.). 
 170. Id. 
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capital, probably between $500 million and $1 billion, in order to buy 
enough policies, probably between 300 and 500, in order to have a pool 
that was diversified enough to reduce risk sufficiently.
171
  S&P has 
concluded that the pool should contain at least 1,000 lives.
172
  A life 
settlement company executive has suggested that the warehouse lending 
concept that was popular for mortgage securitizations could be resurrected 
for securitizing life insurance policies.
173
  Warehouse lending refers to a 
short-term revolving line of credit that could be used to fund the purchase 
of policies until their sale in the secondary market when the line of credit 
would be paid off.
174
 
 C.  Examples of Life Settlement Securitizations 
In spite of the drawbacks, Tarrytown Second, LLC issued the first 
securitization of life insurance policies in January 2004.
175
  It was a $63 
million issue of seven-percent-annual-coupon bonds, maturing in 
December 2011, backed by life insurance policies with a total face value of 
$195 million.
176
  The life expectancies of the insureds ranged from four to 
seven years.
177
  A.M. Best gave the securitization a preliminary AA- 
rating.
178
 
Legacy Benefits Life Insurance Settlements issued the second 
securitization of life insurance policies in April 2004 for $70 million.
179
  It 
had two tranches that matured in 2039:  the less risky one with a 5.35% 
coupon was rated A1 by Moody‘s; the more risky one with a 6.05% coupon 
was rated Baa2 by Moody‘s.
180
  The average age of the insureds was 
seventy-seven.
181
  This transaction was underwritten by Merrill Lynch, and 
the pool contained some annuities in addition to the life insurance 
 
 171. Life Settlement Securitizations Need Warehousing, Liquidity to Flourish, 
RISKMARKETNEWS, Oct. 2, 2009, 
http://www.riskmarketnews.com/files/938280891c3fe3457d11705368c62895-67.html. 
 172. Thomas, supra note 159. 
 173. Life Settlement Securitizations Need Warehousing, Liquidity to Flourish, 
RISKMARKETNEWS, Oct. 2, 2009,  
http://www.riskmarketnews.com/files/938280891c3fe3457d11705368c62895-67.html. 
 174. Warehouse Lending Definition, 
http://www.mbaa.org/IndustryResources/ResourceCenters/WarehouseLendingDefinition.ht
m (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) (defining warehouse lending as it applies to mortgages). 
 175. Charles A. Stone & Anne Zissu, Securitization of Senior Life Settlements: 
Managing Extension Risk, 13 J. DERIVATIVES 66, 66 (2006). 
 176. Id. at 71. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 71-72. 
 181. Id. at 72. 
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policies.
182
  Annuities can even out the cash-flow ups and downs that could 
arise over the course of the notes because of the longevity risk inherent in 
life settlements.
183
 
In January 2009, A.M. Best issued its first final debt rating associated 
with a life settlement securitization for Fieldstone Securitization I LLC on 
about $2.54 billion of securities collateralized by about $8.4 billion in face 
value of life insurance policies.
184
  Later that year, A.M. Best also rated a 
securitization of life settlement policies done by Risk Finance, a unit of 
American International Group (AIG), with $8.4 billion in face value of 
more than 2000 of its own policies.
185
 
The difference in the size of these securitizations in the five-year 
period between 2004 and 2009 suggests growth in the life settlement 
industry.  It is difficult to adequately discuss the number of these deals or 
their details because most life settlement securitizations are private 
placements.
186
 
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE LIFE SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 
The President of the industry‘s trade association has referred to the 
―‗ick‘ factor‖ in the industry‘s business, but has asserted that it is ―no 
different than the life insurance business itself.‖
187
  What he was ignoring is 
the insurance carrier‘s interest in having the insured live so it can continue 
to collect premiums before it has to pay out a death benefit compared to the 
life settlement investor‘s interest in having the insured die quickly so that it 
can stop paying premiums and collect the death benefit sooner.  Life 
insurance companies have a mortality risk—that the insured will die earlier 
than expected; life settlement investors have a longevity risk—that the 
insured will live longer than expected.  That is a big difference. 
The primary purpose of life insurance for families and for society is to 
keep families from economic disaster should the family‘s breadwinner fall 
victim to an untimely death.
188
  Life insurance can keep a young family in 
 
 182. Jennifer Banzaca, Life Settlements: Life Settlement Securitizations Offer Hedge 
funds Efficient Access to an Inefficient Market, HEDGE FUND L. REP., Nov. 5, 2009, at 3. 
 183. Id. at 2. 
 184. A.M. BEST, supra note 155, at 2-3. 
 185. Banzaca, supra note 182, at 2; Green, supra note 165. 
 186. Recent Innovations in Securitization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital 
Markets, Ins., & Gov‘t Sponsored Enterprises of the Comm. on H. Fin. Services, 111th 
Cong. 38 (2009) (prepared statement of Daniel Curry, President, DBRS, Inc.). 
 187. Weir, supra note 158. 
 188. See, e.g., Recent Innovations in Securitization:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Mkts, Ins., & Gov‘t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on H. Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 
99 (2009) (statement of the Hon. Susan E. Voss, Comm‘r, Iowa Insurance Commission, and 
Vice President, National Association of Insurance Commissioners) (―The basic purpose of 
having life insurance is to provide financial security in the event of death for individual, 
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its home and keep it from being a burden on taxpayers.  Because life 
insurance companies figured out that they could make more money by 
combining life insurance with other financial products does not mean that 
life insurance policies should now be primarily a cash machine for anyone 
who can figure out how to ―unlock‖ it, whether they are senior citizens or 
life settlement investors. 
Some of the problems with the life settlement industry are well-
known.  The most obvious is the one that the insurable interest doctrine 
was supposed to remove from the life insurance business—that is, to some 
stranger, the insured is now worth a lot more dead then alive.
189
  Even if 
one is not concerned about murder, the results may not be pleasant.  One 
senior citizen reported that after selling his $1 million life insurance policy 
for a little over $100,000 to a life settlement company, the company calls 
him every few months to see if he is still alive.
190
 
Another problem is that if the insureds maximize their life insurance 
coverage and then sell their policies for a life settlement, they may not be 
able to get life insurance again if their circumstances change.
191
  A related 
problem is that the elderly or infirm, the primary targets of life settlement 
firms, may be taken advantage of by brokers who do not explain all the 
ramifications of the agreements they are entering into.
192
  Insureds may not 
realize that any gain they receive on their policies is taxable.
193
  Insureds 
may not understand that the sale of their policies in the secondary market 
after the two year contestability period is up is not guaranteed.
194
  Private 
 
family, and business needs.‖). 
 189. Even the insurable interest rule does not remove all the ramifications of the insured 
being worth more dead than alive.  There are many reported examples of one spouse killing 
another or other relatives killing each other ―for the insurance money.‖  See, e.g., Martin, 
supra note 31, at  661 n.48. 
 190. Weir, supra note 158. 
 191. Franklin L. Best, Jr., Securitization of Life Insurance Policies, 44 TORT TRIAL & 
INS. PRAC. L.J. 911, 916 (2009). 
 192. Recent Innovations in Securitization, supra note 186, at 40. 
 193. See Recent Innovations in Securitization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital 
Mkts, Ins., & Gov‘t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on H. Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 44 
(2009) (statement of J. Russel Dorsett, Co-Managing Dir. of Veris Settlement Partners, and 
President, Life Insurance Settlement Association) (―It has always been recognized that the 
gain received by the seller (policy owner) was taxable . . . .‖).  The proceeds of the sale 
minus the premiums paid plus the value of insurance protection for the period the policy 
was in force is taxable, partially as ordinary income, partially as capital gains.  For a term 
policy, all proceeds are taxed as capital gains.  Rev. Rul. 2009-13 I.R.B. 686; Rev. Rul. 
2009-11 I.R.B. 686. 
 194. See, e.g., Tom Sharpe, S.F. Bank Among Targets of Investor Suit, SANTA FE NEW 
MEXICAN, Nov. 27, 2009, at A6, available at 
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/localnews/S-F--bank-among-targets-of-investor-suit 
(reporting a suit filed by elderly investors against financial consultants who did not sell their 
life insurance policies and who told them to ―just hang in there‖ until the incontestability 
period of the policies would expire). 
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information about insureds, including their medical conditions, will be 
made known to strangers because the investors will be entitled to full 
disclosure about the risks they are undertaking.
195
 
Investors, too, may not understand the complicated financial product 
they are buying.  The AARP has warned that life settlements are one of the 
top ten investment scams.
196
  One estimate is that investors, with an average 
age of seventy years old, have been cheated of up to $2 billion nationwide 
between 1996 and 2007, averaging $40,000 per investor in life settlement 
frauds.
197
  Investors may be deceived about the rate of return on their 
investment because they cannot know how long the insureds will live.
198
  
They may not realize that they have to keep paying premiums as long as 
the insureds are alive because if the policies lapse, then investors lose 
everything.
199
  There are also risks associated with the viability of the 
insurance company and legal challenges by the families of the insureds.
200
  
Insurance companies may refuse to pay the death benefit because of alleged 
fraud by the insured.
201
  Investors may also not understand the tax 
implications of their investments.
202
 
 
 195. See Betting on Death in the Life Settlement Market—What‘s at Stake for Seniors:  
Hearing Before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 111th Cong. (Apr. 29, 2009), available at 
2009 WLNR 8154008 (statement of Mary Beth Senkewicz, Deputy Ins. Comm‘r of the 
Florida Office of Insurance Regulation) (―Seniors may also have to give the investor, and 
subsequent investors, access to their confidential medical records when they sell their life 
insurance policy in the secondary market.‖). 
 196. Dana Shilling, Viatical and Life Settlements, 204 ELDER L. ADVISORY 1, 4 
(February 2008). 
 197. Id.  For example, an insurance agent in Florida was arrested and charged with fraud 
and grand theft after earning $1,600,000 on policies worth $78,000,000 for which he had 
submitted applications with false information to insurance companies and then arranged for 
their sale on the secondary market.  Florida Insurance Agent Arrested in Alleged $78M 
STOLI Scheme, LIFE SETTLEMENTS REP., Apr. 23, 2010, 
http://lifesettlements.dealflowmedia.com/wires/article.cfm?id=wnosbnpndlxxuud.  The 
director of the Texas State Securities Board enforcement division has called the Texas life 
settlement industry the ―Wild West‖ because of all the cases of fraud his office has pursued.  
Dave Lieber, Texas is the ‗Wild West‘ of the Life Settlement Industry, STAR-TELEGRAM, 
May 2, 2010, http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/05/01/v-print/2156969/texas-is-the-wild-
west-of-life.html. 
 198. Shilling, supra note 196. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Rob Curran, The Pros and Cons of Betting on Death, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2010, at 
R7.  Among the frauds is ―clean sheeting‖ which refers to an insured hiding medical 
conditions from the insurance company.  Id.  Insureds may also lie to life settlement brokers 
by ―dirty sheeting,‖ that is, saying they are sicker than they really are in order to get a higher 
price for their policy because of the likelihood of a quicker death.  Id. 
 202. If an investor gets a death benefit or sells the policy to another, his taxable income 
is the death benefit or the sale proceeds minus the amount paid to the policy owner and any 
premiums paid.  Death benefit proceeds are taxed as ordinary income, not as a capital gain.  
Sale proceeds are taxed as a capital gain.  Because the investor purchased the policy, it was 
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Some critics have predicted that life settlement companies will be 
lobbying against improvements in health care because of their interest in 
early deaths.
203
  The most serious practical problem is for the whole regime 
of life insurance.  Life settlements, if they become numerous, will cause 
everyone‘s premiums to rise, because life insurance companies, in 
determining pricing, count on a certain percentage of policies lapsing so 
that no death benefit will ever be paid even though premium payments 
have been made.
204
 
VI. REGULATION 
Life settlements are now regulated in forty-four states and legislation 
is pending in several of the rest.
205
  Both the National Conference of 
 
a ―transfer for a valuable consideration,‖ and therefore, there is no exception for a transfer 
involving parties related to the insured.  Rev. Rul. 2009-14 I.R.B. 687; Rev. Rul. 2009-11 
I.R.B. 687. 
 203. Weir, supra note 158 (quoting Michael Greenberger, former Director of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission). 
 204. See Best, supra note 191, at 915, 916 (noting that insurers‘ pricing assumes that 
some policies will lapse and that pricing which responds to ―investors‘ arbitraging 
practices‖ could ―make insurance too expensive.‖). 
 205. Rachel B. Coan & Henry Bregstein, Recently Proposed New York Life Settlement 
Regulation May Have a Significant Impact Upon Those Conducting Business in the State, 
KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP (June 3, 2009), http://www.kattenlaw.com/recently-
proposed-new-york-life-settlement-regulation-may-have-a-significant-impact-upon-those-
conducting-business-in-the-state-06-03-2009/ (follow ―Download PDF‖ hyperlink).  For 
example, in January 2010 a bill was introduced in the Pennsylvania House that amends the 
state‘s Viatical Settlements Act to include a definition of stranger-originated life insurance 
or STOLI as a: 
practice or plan to initiate a life insurance policy for the benefit of a third-party 
investor who, at the time of policy origination, has no insurable interest in the 
insured. STOLI practices include, but are not limited to: (1) Cases in which life 
insurance is purchased with resources or guarantees from or through a person or 
entity who, at the time of inception, has a verbal or written arrangement or 
agreement to directly or indirectly transfer the ownership  of the policy or the 
policy benefits to a third party. (2) Trusts created to give the appearance of 
insurable interest which are used to initiate policies for investors, violate or 
evade insurable interest laws and the prohibition against wagering on life. 
H.B. 2188, 194th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Pa. 2010).  The bill then provides: 
[i]t is a violation of this act for a person to enter into a viatical settlement 
contract prior to the application or issuance of a policy which is the subject of 
viatical settlement contract or within a five-year period commencing with the 
date of issuance of the insurance policy or certificate unless the viator certifies 
to the viatical settlement provider that one or more of the following conditions 
have been met within the five-year period . . . . 
Id. at § 6(a), and then goes on to list circumstances such as ―(i) the viator insured is 
terminally or chronically ill; (ii) the viator's spouse dies; (iii) the viator divorces his or her 
spouse . . . .‖  Id. 
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Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) and the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) have developed model acts regulating viatical and 
life settlements,
206
 and most states that have enacted life settlements 
legislation since 2007 have used one of the two models or a combination of 
both.
207
  The NAIC created its first model act, the Viatical Settlements 
Model Act, in December 2006 in response to increased STOLI activity, 
which the commissioners perceived as problematic.
208
  State legislators 
wrote their version, the Life Insurance Settlements Model Act, in 
November 2007.
209
  The purpose of both is to address abuses in the life 
settlement industry by requiring more disclosure to policy owners and by 
putting limitations on STOLI.
210
 
The NCOIL Model Act attempts to ban all STOLI by prohibiting any 
―practice or plan to initiate life insurance for the benefit of a 3rd party 
investor who, at inception, has no insurable interest in the insured.‖
211
  The 
NAIC Model Act attempts to eliminate STOLI indirectly by establishing a 
five-year moratorium on policies sold to third parties when the insured is 
not suffering a medical, financial, or family downturn in circumstances.
212
  
A sale would be much less attractive to insureds if they had to wait five 
years to get their money.  The NCOIL Model Act has a two-year ban, 
which coincides with the contestability period in most states.
213
 
The NCOIL Model Act also defines as fraud any violation of insurable 
interest laws; the NAIC Model Act has no such provision.
214
  The NCOIL 
act also specifically allows insurance companies to require applicants for 
life insurance to certify that they have not made any agreement to sell the 
policy or received any remuneration for buying the policy; there is nothing 
 
 206. See News Release, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC 
Adopts Viatical Settlements Model Act Revisions (June 4, 2007), 
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2007_docs/viatical_settlements_model.htm (last visited Sept. 
26, 2010) (announcing the adoption of Model Act revisions addressing STOLI and other 
issues in the life settlement marketplace); see also VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT 
(Nat‘l Ass‘n of Ins. Comm‘rs 2007); LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (Nat‘l Conf. of Ins. 
Legislators 2007). 
 207. Coan & Bregstein, supra note 205. 
 208. R. Leimberg, Stranger Originated Life Insurance (STOLI):  What Counsel (and 
What Every Advisor) Must Absolutely Positively Know!, ADVANCED ESTATE PLANNING 
TECHNIQUES 573, 629 (2009).  NAIC revised its Model Act in June 2007.  Id. 
 209. Id. at 629-30. 
 210. See generally id. (outlining the purposes and requirements of the model acts). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 629-33.  The five-year moratorium does not apply to policies purchased with 
the policyowner‘s own money.  Am. Council of Life Insurers & Nat‘l Ass‘s of Ins. and Fin. 
Advisors, 2009 Shaping Up as Active Year in Battle to Deter Abuse of Seniors by STOLI 
Promoters, STOLI ALERT (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.flseniors.net/images/StoliAlert_nov08.pdf. 
 213. Leimberg, supra note 208, at 629-33. 
 214. Id. at 631. 
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similar in the NAIC Act.
215
  Both Acts prohibit advertising ―free‖ life 
insurance.
216
 
In 2008, eleven states enacted legislation to eliminate STOLI.
217
  Ohio, 
for example, enacted a statute deeming STOLI ―void and unenforceable.‖
218
  
The statute follows the NAIC plan of a five-year moratorium and uses 
some NCOIL provisions, including the STOLI definition.
219
  One unusual 
provision is the requirement that life insurance companies have to file with 
the Superintendent of Insurance ―a description of the measures taken by the 
insurance company to detect and prevent stranger-originated life 
insurance.‖
220
  This legislation amended viatical settlements law that Ohio 
has had since 2001 to address fraud and deception of policy owners and 
investors.
221
 
North Dakota banned STOLI
222
 using the NAIC model of prohibiting 
the sale of a life insurance policy within five years of its issuance but only 
if the policy owner has borrowed the money to pay the premiums—a 
common sign of STOLI—with exceptions for divorce, disability, or the 
death of a spouse.
223
  Indiana‘s anti-STOLI law
224
 says that insurance 
companies cannot use the allegation that a policy is a STOLI to deny 
payment of the death benefit after the two-year contestability period, but 
the insurance company can attempt to void a policy at any time for lack of 
an insurable interest at the time the policy was issued.
225
 
Additional states passed life settlement laws with a variety of 
provisions in 2009.
226
  Washington State, for example, enacted a statute 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Am. Council of Life Insurers & Nat‘l Ass‘n of Ins. and Fin. Advisors, supra note 
212; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.404(1) (West 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431E-2 
(LexisNexis 2008) (repealed June 16, 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-19.8-20.1 (West 2008); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4055.2(7)(e) (West 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-13C-2(18) 
(LexisNexis 2008). 
 218. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3916.172 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 219. Ohio‘s Anti-STOLI Legislation, BRICKER & ECKLER LLP (June 3, 2008), 
http://www.bricker.com/documents/publications/1267.pdf. 
 220. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.021 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 221. Ohio‘s Anti-STOLI Legislation, supra note 218. 
 222. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.4-01(23) (2009). 
 223. Kimberly Lankford, The Strange Saga of STOLI, KIPLINGER‘S PERS. FIN., July 
2008, at 67. 
 224. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-19.8-20.1 (West 2008). 
 225. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-12-44 (West 2008). 
 226. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-81-802(24) (2009); CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1(w) 
(West 2009); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 159/50(a) (2010); MINN. STAT. § 60A.0782 subd. 12 
(2009); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7815(a)-(b) (McKinney 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 744.318(18) 
(2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-50-102(l2) (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3835(18) (2010); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.102.006(25) (2009). 
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based on the NCOIL model.
227
  The statute bans life settlement agreements 
within two years of the policy‘s issuance,
228
 and it requires a report to the 
state insurance commissioner‘s office if a policy is sold within five years of 
being issued.
229
  The law also requires insurance companies to tell policy 
owners over the age of sixty that they have the right to enter into a life 
settlement agreement.
230
  That was the first time a state had imposed a life 
settlement mandatory disclosure rule on insurance companies.
231
  When 
California enacted its anti-STOLI legislation near the end of 2009,
232
 it 
prohibited insurance companies from restricting lawful life settlements and 
restricting agents from telling insureds that life settlements are an option.
233
 At the end of 2009, New York enacted a life settlement statute that 
prohibits STOLI as being in violation of the state‘s insurable interest 
laws,
234
 and prohibits everyone from participating in STOLI.
235
  The law 
requires everyone engaging in the business of life settlements to be licensed 
by the state Superintendent of Insurance.
236
  One of the New York 
requirements that has been most decried by the life settlement industry is 
the licensing fee, which was originally set by the Superintendent of 
Insurance at $20,000 with a biennial renewal fee of $5,000.
237
  After much 
pressure from the life settlement industry,
238
 the licensing fee was reduced 
to $10,000.
239
  The more common state licensing fee is between $500 and 
$1,000.
240
 
Minnesota‘s 2009 law outlaws STOLI
241
 and allows the insured‘s 
estate to recover death benefits from a policy initiated by a STOLI 
 
 227. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.102 (2009). 
 228. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.102.110(14) (2009). 
 229. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.102.046 (2009); Sean P. Carr, Washington State Enacts 
STOLI Bill with Mandatory Disclosure, INS. NEWS NET, Apr. 23, 2009, 
http://www.insurancenewsnet.org/html/BreakingNews/2009/0423/Washington-State-
Enacts-STOLI-Bill-With-Mandatory-Disclosure.html. 
 230. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.102.100(1) (2009). 
 231. Carr, supra note 229. 
 232. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1(w) (West 2009). 
 233. Bob Graham, California to Regulate Life Settlements, Forbids STOLI Deals, INS. & 
FIN. ADVISOR, Oct. 20, 2009, http://ifawebnews.com/2009/10/20/california-to-regulate-life-
settlements/html. 
 234. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7815(a)-(b) (McKinney 2009). 
 235. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7815(c) (McKinney 2009). 
 236. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7803 (McKinney 2009). 
 237. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 381.0(a), (c) (2010) (draft). 
 238. New York Halves Providers‘ Licensing Fee to $10,000, LIFE SETTLEMENTS REP., 
Apr. 27, 2010, http://lifesettlements.dealflowmedia.com/wires/archive.cfm?nd=042610. 
 239. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 381.1(a) (2010). 
 240. New York Halves Providers‘ Licensing Fee to $10,000, supra note 238; New York 
Officials Not Backing Off $20,000 Provider Fee, LIFE SETTLEMENT SOURCE, Apr. 6, 2010, 
http://www.the lifesettlementsource.com/archive.cfm?nd=040510. 
 241. MINN. STAT. § 60A.0782, subd. 12 (2009). 
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scheme.
242
  Where violations are willful, a court can order exemplary 
damages up to twice the death benefits.
243
  Most other states prohibit 
STOLI and then have their own particular requirements on licensing, 
reporting, disclosures, advertising, privacy, monetary penalties or prison 
sentences, or both for non-compliance.
244
 
The variation in state provisions and the fact that life settlements are 
still unregulated in some states can be problematic for some life settlement 
participants.  The purpose of most of the laws is to protect insureds, policy 
owners, beneficiaries, and sometimes investors; however, if a policy owner 
who wants to sell lives in an unregulated state, neither the insured, nor the 
beneficiaries, nor the investors will have protection even if their own states 
regulate life settlements.
245
  This situation suggests that federal regulation 
would be preferable to achieve standardized protections for all parties 
involved.
246
  Several federal institutions have shown interest in greater 
federal involvement in the life settlement industry.  On April 29, 2009, the 
Senate Special Committee on Aging held hearings on the life settlement 
market as it relates to senior citizens.
247
  On September 24, 2009, the House 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored 
Enterprises held hearings on securitization of life settlements.
248
  In August 
2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) created a task force 
to examine the life settlement industry.
249
 
Following the Senate Special Committee on Aging hearings, the 
 
 242. Minnesota Outlaws Life-Insurance Scheme, MINNEAPOLIS / ST. PAUL BUS. J., May 
11, 2009, http://twincities.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2009/05/11/daily. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-465j(a)(2) (Michie 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 
33-59-2(24) (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1962(1) (Michie 2009); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
159/50(a), 159/72(a) (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-5002(l) (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
304.15-020(7)(a)(1)(k), (15) (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6802-A(6)(A)(3), 
(12-A) (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 4055.2(7)(e) (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-72-2(26) 
(2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-36-102(18) (2009); see also MAJORITY STAFF OF S. 
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 111TH CONG., LIFE SETTLEMENTS:  RISKS TO SENIORS—
SUMMARY OF COMM. INVESTIGATION, at 2, 7-8 (2009) (noting state action to increase 
transparency of life settlements industry but also noting inconsistency). 
 245. Recent Innovations in Securitization:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital 
Mkts, Ins., & Gov‘t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on H. Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 70-71 
(2009) (statement of Kurt Gearhart, Global Head of Regulatory and Execution Risk,  Life 
Finance Group, Credit Suisse). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Betting on Death in the Life Settlement Market–What‘s at Stake for Seniors:  
Hearing Before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 111th Cong. (Apr. 29, 2009), available at 
2009 WLNR 8154008. 
 248. Recent Innovations in Securitization:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital 
Mkts., Ins., & Gov‘t Sponsored Enter.s of the Comm. on H. Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2009). 
 249. Darla Mercado, SEC Creates Life Settlements Task Force, INVESTMENTNEWS, Sept. 
16, 2009, 
http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090916/FREE/909169986. 
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committee‘s chair, Senator Kohl, noted the importance of the federal role in 
addressing life settlements, ―a complex transaction that may be fraught 
with hidden pitfalls.‖
250
  Congressman Kanjorski, chairman of the House 
Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises, noted, in announcing the 
subcommittee‘s hearings on securitization of life settlements, ―the dangers 
of excess that securitization can cause‖ and the importance of reforming 
―the rules by which the financial industry operates.
251
  Mary Schapiro, 
chairman of the SEC, in a letter to Senator Kohl, explained that life 
settlements sometimes involve securities subject to federal securities 
laws.
252
  One such situation occurs if the policy being sold is a variable life 
insurance policy which is itself a security; another is if the policy is sold in 
order to buy securities with the proceeds.
253
  She promised to study whether 
the SEC needed to regulate life settlement transactions more specifically.
254
 
VII. LIFE SETTLEMENT LITIGATION 
As states were enacting legislation to regulate the life settlement 
industry and the federal government was studying it, the life settlement 
industry and STOLI in particular were giving rise to many lawsuits, 
making courts the interim regulators.  The growth of STOLI policies and 
scams is indicated by the growth in the number of cases in which STOLI is 
involved.  In 2005, there was one STOLI case in the nation; by the end of 
2008, there were 105 pending in state and federal courts.
255
  The facts of 
one case currently being litigated in a New Mexico state district court 
exemplify problems with life settlements and why the worthwhile concept 
of life insurance must be separated from corrosive and unrelated financial 
products. 
Five wealthy, elderly Texans went to New Mexico
256
 to form a 
 
 250. Press Release, S. Special Comm. on Aging, Kohl Calls for Better Regulation, More 
Transparency of Life Settlement Market (May 1, 2009), 
http://aging.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=312359. 
 251. Press Release, H. Fin. Servs. Comm., Capital Markets to Examine the Securitization 
of Life Insurance Settlements (Sept. 23, 2009), 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs_dem/presskanjorski_092309.shtml. 
 252. Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, to Senator 
Herb Kohl, Chairman, S. Special Comm. on Aging, (Apr. 28, 2009), in MAJORITY STAFF OF 
S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 111TH CONG., LIFE SETTLEMENTS:  RISKS TO SENIORS – 
SUMMARY OF COMM. INVESTIGATION, app. II at 10-11 (2009). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS & NAT‘L ASSOC. OF INS. & FIN. ADVISORS, STOLI 
ALERT, at 1 (Nov. 2008), http://www.flseniors.net/images/StoliAlert_nov08.pdf. 
 256. New Mexico does not regulate life settlements although it has a 1999 statute that 
regulates viatical settlements for the terminally ill.  Corey Pein, Die, Already!, SANTA FE 
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company to drill for oil in a stake that could produce twenty-five million 
barrels of oil, but they needed money to pay for the drilling.
257
  Following 
the advice of a financial planner, four of them took out life insurance 
policies totaling $80 million of face value expecting the planner to sell the 
policies for $16 million.
258
  They paid nothing for the policies because the 
planner enlisted ―consultants‖ who got a Santa Fe company set up by a 
Connecticut insurance executive to finance the premiums at 21.33% 
interest.
259
  The ―consultants‖ were unable to sell the policies so the Texans 
were stuck with a $13 million bill for the insurance premiums and 
interest.
260
  The Texans‘ complaint alleges that they were knowledgeable 
about the technical aspects of their drilling project but naive about the 
financial arrangement.
261
  Among the allegations in the complaint are fraud, 
unfair trade practices, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duties.
262
  
That the insureds in that case were wealthy and elderly is typical, because 
the wealthier the insureds, the larger the policies the insurance companies 
will write.  The more elderly the insureds, the sooner they are likely to die, 
and all the benefit goes to the ultimate investors, if there are any.  Although 
this case does not elicit strong sympathy for any of the parties involved, it 
suggests that life settlements pervert the purpose of life insurance and 
create profits for planners, agents, brokers, or originators who have added 
nothing of value, and if duplicated often enough, to the detriment of future 
premium payers. 
Many of the cases involving life settlements are based on 
misrepresentations on the life insurance policy application or on the lack of 
an insurable interest.  Both of these issues were raised in a 2009 case of 
first impression in New Jersey.
263
  A ―broker‖ introduced seventy-five-
year-old Calhoun to a Lincoln National Life Insurance Company agent who 
introduced Calhoun to a California resident who was to be named trustee of 
the Walter Calhoun Family Insurance Trust, which Calhoun established.
264
  
The broker told Calhoun he could apply for a life insurance policy and then 
sell it for a profit at no cost to himself.
265
  Calhoun applied to Lincoln for a 
$3 million policy naming the Trust as the owner and beneficiary.
266
  On the 
 
REP., Nov. 17, 2009, at 13. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Tom Sharpe, S.F. Bank Among Targets of Investor Suit, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, 
Nov. 27, 2009, at A6. 
 259. Pein, supra note 256; Sharpe, supra note 258. 
 260. Sharpe, supra note 258. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Lincoln Nat‘l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 264. Id. at 886. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
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insurance application, Calhoun answered ―no‖ to a question that asked if 
the applicant had ―engaged in any discussions regarding possible sale or 
assignment of the policy to ‗a life settlement, viatical or other secondary 
market provider.‘‖
267
  About twenty-two months after issuing the policy, 
Lincoln came to believe that Calhoun‘s policy was a STOLI policy and 
sued to have the policy declared void because of Calhoun‘s material 
misrepresentations and because of the absence of an insurable interest.
268
  
The federal district court held that Lincoln stated a claim on both issues.
269
 
The court asserted that the instant case illustrated a growing debate 
between the insurance industry and ―investment speculators.‖
270
  The court 
noted that in a STOLI transaction the insured is ―‗selling his policy to a 
stranger whose only interest in the insured is his early demise.‘‖
271
  In 
deciding the material misrepresentation issue, the court was emphatic that 
insurance companies can deny coverage based on the applicant‘s 
undertaking a variety of legal activities, including assigning the policy, if 
there are untruths on the application.
272
  The court then cited the Supreme 
Court‘s opinion in Grigsby v. Russell
273
 in 1911 for the proposition that 
―[l]ife insurance policies must be secured by an insurable interest to be 
valid‖
274
 because otherwise, life insurance contracts would merely be 
wagers.
275
  Under both California and New Jersey law, an insurable interest 
is required at the time a policy is issued, but both states permit an insured 
to then transfer ownership to a person or entity without an insurable 
interest.
276
  The court asserted, however, that it ―run[s] afoul‖ of the 
insurable interest law when the insured procures a policy with the intention 
at the time of issuance to transfer it for a profit to someone without an 
insurable interest.
277
  The court noted, however, that courts outside of New 
Jersey had differed on the role of intent in determining insurable interest.
278
  
The following two cases illustrate those differences. 
In the beginning of 2008, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York allowed a case to go forward based on 
allegations that an insured intended to transfer his life insurance policy in 
 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 888-90. 
 270. Id. at 884. 
 271. Id. at 885 (quoting Life Prod. Clearing LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 648 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
 272. Id. at 888. 
 273. 222 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1911). 
 274. Lincoln, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 888. 
 275. Id. at 889. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 889-90. 
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violation of New York‘s prohibition on wager policies.
279
  In that case, 
Lobel, a seventy-seven-year-old retired butcher, learning about a new 
―financial opportunity‖ from an insurance agent, established the Leon 
Lobel Insurance Trust with himself as the beneficiary, and on the same day, 
he applied for a $10 million life insurance policy naming the Trust as the 
beneficiary.
280
  Less than a week later he sold the Trust to Life Product 
Clearing LLC for $300,000.
281
  In their agreement, Life Product agreed to 
pay all the policy premiums in exchange for receiving the death benefit 
when Lobel died.
282
  He received the money about seven weeks later and 
died five days after receipt of the money.
283
  After investigating for a year, 
the insurance company paid the Trust $10,712,328.77, the face amount of 
the policy plus interest.
284
  In this case, Life Product sued Lobel‘s daughter, 
the personal representative of his estate, for a declaration that Life Product 
is the rightful beneficiary of the Trust.
285
  The daughter counterclaimed 
arguing that Lobel‘s agreement with Life Product was void as against 
public policy because it involved a ―wager policy‖ with Life Product, a 
stranger gambling on Lobel‘s life.
286
 
The Southern District discussed the new life settlement industry and 
stated that stranger-owned (not stranger-originated) life insurance policies: 
are lawful only if the insured purchases the policy with a good-
faith intent to obtain insurance for the benefit of his family, loved 
one, or business; they are not lawful if the insured purchases the 
policy with the intent to resell it to a stranger at the earliest 
possible moment.
287 
The court concluded that this was a case that turned on the issue of 
intent and, therefore, it could not be decided summarily.
288
 
In deciding a case of first impression in Minnesota at the end of 2008, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota held that a life 
insurance policy is not void ab initio when the policy owner‘s intent upon 
issuance of the policy was to transfer the policy for a profit to a third party 
without an insurable interest unless there is ―evidence of the intent of a 
third party to buy the policies at the time they were procured, which 
necessarily requires identification of that party.‖
289
  The court held that the 
 
 279. Life Prod. Clearing, LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 655-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 280. Id. at 647-48. 
 281. Id. at 647. 
 282. Id. at 649. 
 283. Id. at 647. 
 284. Id. at 647-48. 
 285. Id. at 648. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 656. 
 289. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Paulson, No. 07-3877, 2008 WL 5120953, at *4 
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policy owner‘s intent by itself is ―irrelevant.‖
290
 
Although the New York and Minnesota cases had opposite results, the 
difference in holdings can be attributed to the differences in the facts.  
Unlike the New York case where there were allegations naming the third 
party who induced the insured to take out the life insurance policy, in the 
Minnesota case, the insurance company could not, after postponing a 
hearing and taking several depositions, produce the identity of a third party 
who intended to buy the policy owner‘s policies at the time they were 
issued.
291
  Whether the New York court was more inclined to let 
circumstantial evidence be persuasive about the third party‘s involvement 
in the purchase of the insurance policy ab initio is also a possibility.  In the 
New York case, if the outcome is ―no ‗insurable interest‘,‖ then the $10 
million plus interest will go to Lobel‘s heirs instead of to life settlement 
investors.
292
  In the Minnesota case, if the outcome is ―lack[ing] an 
insurable interest,‖ then the insurance company will not have to pay a death 
benefit to anyone.
293
 
None of these choices is particularly attractive because involvement in 
a STOLI scheme should not reap benefits for anyone—not the investors, 
not the heirs of the insured, not the insurance company.  Life settlement 
companies know they are acting illegally when they participate in STOLI 
schemes; they and their investors should not benefit from their 
involvement.  The insured should not be able to have it both ways:  getting 
money while alive from a life settlement company in exchange for illegally 
buying life insurance policies for them, and, if that does not work out for 
the investors, then the insured‘s heirs will get the proceeds from the 
policies—a win-win situation for participating in an illegal scheme.  The 
insurance company should not collect premiums for STOLI policies and 
then never have to pay out a death benefit at all.  Insurance companies 
should have to forfeit premiums collected if they failed to perform due 
diligence in writing policies where there is no insurable interest. 
In early 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit applying Arizona law agreed with the Minnesota decision.
294
  In 
that case, Moore, an Arizona resident, according to the court, ―commenced 
a fraudulent scheme.‖
295
  Moore bought seven life insurance policies with a 
total face value of $8.5 million.
296
  Within months he sold the policies with 
 
(D. Minn. Dec. 3, 2008). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at *2. 
 292. Life Prod. Clearing, LLC, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 648. 
 293. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 2008 WL 5120953, at *5. 
 294. First Penn-Pac. Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 313 F. App‘x 633, 636 n.3 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 
2009). 
 295. Id. at 634. 
 296. Id. at 635. 
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the help of a viatical settlement broker after falsely claiming to be 
terminally ill.
297
  The insurance company tried to have one of the policies 
declared void ab initio by claiming that Moore did not have an insurable 
interest because of his intent to sell the policies to strangers at the time he 
applied for them.
298
  The court held that Moore did have an insurable 
interest when he obtained the policy because ―[n]o third party participated 
in the procurement of Moore‘s policy and therefore no one was ‗wagering‘ 
on Moore‘s life in violation of public policy.‖
299
  The court cited the 
difficulty of ―evaluating insurable interest on the basis of the subjective 
intent of the insured at the time the policy issues.‖
300
  This argument is not 
very persuasive, because intent is used to decide a myriad of issues 
throughout the law, particularly in criminal and tort cases, without making 
the law in those areas ―unworkable.‖
301
  The court rather outrageously 
refused to consider subjective intent in evaluating insurable interest 
because doing so ―would inject uncertainty into the secondary market for 
insurance.‖
302
  It is difficult to understand why the court assumed 
responsibility to protect the life settlement industry.  In so doing, the court 
is encouraging life insurance scams. 
In July 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California, applying California law, also held that the insured‘s intent is 
irrelevant in deciding whether the insured had an insurable interest, noting 
that it was enforcing existing law even though it was ―‗bad law.‘‖
303
 At 
issue were three $10 million life insurance policies purchased by Fishman 
from the Lincoln National Life Insurance Company naming as beneficiary 
the Fishman Trust which designated Fishman‘s four sons as trust 
beneficiaries.
304
  Lincoln brought this case to have the three policies 
declared void because they were STOLI, prohibited under California law.
305
  
Lincoln contended that before the policies were issued, the Fishman Trust 
applied to the Mutual Credit Corporation, a known supplier of non-recourse 
premium financing, and borrowed $2,842,107—enough to cover two years‘ 
worth of premiums on the policies ($2.1 million), origination fees, and a 
―premium reserve‖ that could be used any way the Trust wanted
306
—and 
 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 636. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Lincoln Nat‘l Life Ins. Co. v. Gordon R.A. Fishman Irrevocable Life Trust, 638 F. 
Supp. 2d 1170, 1179-80 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing ―President Ulysses S. Grant, who said that 
‗the best way to get rid of a bad law is to enforce it.‘‖). 
 304. Id. at 1174. 
 305. Id. at 1170-71. 
 306. Id. at 1175-76. 
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almost immediately after the policies were issued, the Trust awarded 
Mutual a collateral assignment.
307
  Lincoln had prior experiences with the 
Mutual Credit Corporation, because Mutual had funded over eighty other 
policies that Lincoln had written.
308
  Of those policies not a single original 
insured or beneficial trust retained ownership of the policies after the two-
year contestability period had expired.
309
  It was known that Mutual‘s 
funding source was a hedge fund that invests in life settlements.
310
 
The Central District Court recounted a detailed description of 
insurable interest under California law.
311
  The court concluded that the 
way the Fishman transactions were conducted, the Fishman Trust, which 
owned the policies when they were issued, had an insurable interest in 
Fishman‘s life.
312
  The court noted the ―not-so-subtle deviousness on the 
part of [Mutual],‖ but held that the court could not look behind the sham 
formalities of the agreement to ―re-write it to reflect what was really going 
on between the various parties [to determine] the existence (or lack thereof) 
of an insurable interest to an insurance policy.‖
313
  The court also noted that 
California law might be changed by the legislature
314
 and that, in fact, is 
what happened.  In October 2009 the governor signed legislation that 
defines illegal STOLI policies as including those in which: 
life insurance is purchased with resources or guarantees from or 
through a person or entity, that, at the time of policy inception, 
could not lawfully initiate the policy himself, herself, or itself, 
and where, at the time of inception, there is an arrangement or 
agreement, to directly or indirectly transfer the ownership of the 
policy or the policy benefits to a third party.  Trusts that are 
created to give the appearance of insurable interest and that are 
used to initiate policies for investors violate insurable interest 
laws and the prohibition against wagering on life.
315
 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 
applying Michigan law in a case with several different claims, held that the 
intention of the insured at the time life insurance policies are issued, to 
transfer them to a third party stranger does violate the insurable interest 
 
 307. Id. at 1178. 
 308. Id. at 1176. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 1177-79. 
 312. Id. at 1178.  Under California law, an irrevocable trust ―may purchase and hold life 
insurance policies on the life of its settlor.  Moreover, Dr. Fishman‘s sons, who were the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the Trust, also have an insurable interest in their father‘s life as . . . 
California law defines relation ‗by blood‘ as rendering it an insurable interest.‖  Id. 
 313. Id. at 1178-79. 
 314. Id. at 1179. 
 315. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1(w) (West 2009). 
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requirement.
316
  The court noted that ―the consensus is that an assignment is 
void if it is made in bad faith in order to circumvent the law on insurable 
interest . . . . The test for determining whether the assignment is valid is the 
intent of the parties.‖
317
 
On the issue of who can assert the lack of an insurable interest in 
procuring a life insurance policy, in May 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit, applying Ohio law, held that only the insurance 
company can assert it, and then the insurance contract is voidable at the 
company‘s option.
318
  In a case where the receiver of a defunct life 
settlement company was seeking to recover the premiums the company had 
paid on life insurance policies it had encouraged elderly people to purchase 
and then assign to the company, the court refused to support a rule that 
would have allowed policy owners who had committed fraud in procuring 
life insurance policies to receive a refund of the premiums paid.
319
  The 
court concluded that doing so would have the ―perverse effect‖ of allowing 
any defrauders to pay premiums knowing that if they ever could not afford 
them, they could get back the premiums they had already paid.
320
 
Two months later the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York also had to decide who can assert the lack of an insurable 
interest in procuring a life insurance policy.
321
  The case involved Moldaw, 
who participated in a scheme suggested by his ―longtime estate-planning 
advisor,‖ for which he purchased ten or twelve insurance policies on his 
life with a total face value of $78 million.
322
  A group of investors bought 
the policies for $4 million and, after Moldaw died, the insurance companies 
paid the death benefits to the investors.
323
  In this case, Moldaw‘s widow 
and a trust he had set up, both domiciled in California, sued the investors, 
domiciled in New York, to recover the insurance payments.
324
  The court 
cited a New York statute that permits the administrator or executor of an 
estate to sue a person or entity that procured a life insurance policy on the 
deceased without having an insurable interest in his or her life.
325
  But the 
court concluded that California law applied to this case, and under 
 
 316. Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. LaSalle Bank N.A., Nos. 2:07-cv-15324, 2:08-cv-11562, 
2009 WL 877684, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2009). 
 317. Id. (citing Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalia, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 36:87 
(2001)). 
 318. Wuliger v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 567 F.3d 787, 796-97 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 319. Id. at 797. 
 320. Id. 
 321. 2004 Stuart Moldaw Trust v. XE L.I.F.E., LLC, 642 F. Supp. 2d 226, 228 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 322. Id. at 228. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. (citing N.Y. INS. LAW § 3205(b) (McKinney)). 
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California law only the insurer can raise the issue of insurable interest.
326
 
The alleged facts of a case ongoing now in the Southern District of 
New York illustrate why the California rule is preferable as a STOLI 
deterrent.  In Kramer v. Lockwood Pension Services, Inc.,
327
 Arthur 
Kramer, a founder of a well-known international law firm, at the age of 
seventy-eight established two trusts with his children as beneficiaries, and 
associates of Lockwood Pension Services as trustees.
328
  Then he took out 
life insurance policies, with himself as the insured and the trusts as owners 
and beneficiaries, with three different life insurance companies for a total 
face value of $56.2 million.
329
  After the policies were issued, Kramer 
allegedly told his children to assign their interests in the trusts to stranger 
investors.
330
  Court documents indicate that one of the children sold her 
rights for a $100,000 payment.
331
  Neither Kramer nor any of the children 
ever made a premium payment.
332
 
Three years later, Kramer at the age of eighty-one died of a stroke 
after taking ill while skiing alone in Sun Valley, Idaho.
333
  Now Kramer‘s 
widow, as the personal representative of his estate, is seeking to have the 
proceeds of the insurance policies paid to her on the grounds that the 
stranger investors had no insurable interest in her husband‘s life.
334
  The 
stranger investors want the proceeds paid to them as holders of the 
beneficial interest in the trusts, and the insurance companies want to have 
the policies voided and not paid to anyone.
335
  No one in this case has clean 
hands; they were all involved in perverting the purpose of life insurance.  
 
 326. Id. at 234-35 (citing Jenkins v. Hill, 96 P.2d 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939); Woodmen of 
the World v. Rutledge, 65 P. 1105 (Cal. 1901)). 
 327. 653 F. Supp. 2d 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (deciding various motions to dismiss).  
Phoenix Life Insurance Co. appealed the District Court decision to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the Second Circuit certified the following question to 
the New York Court of Appeals:  Does New York Insurance Law §§ 3205(b)(1) and (b)(2) 
prohibit an insured from procuring a policy on his own life and immediately transferring the 
policy to a person without an insurable interest in the insured‘s life, if the insured did not 
ever intend to provide insurance protection for a person with an insurable interest in the 
insured‘s life?  Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 176, 2010 WL 4628103, at *1 (Nov. 
17, 2010).  The Court of Appeals answered in the negative and held that ―New York law 
permits a person to procure an insurance policy on his or her own life and immediately 
transfer it to one without an insurable interest in that life, even where the policy was 
obtained for just such a purpose.‖  Id. 
 328. Asher Hawkins, Should Strangers Be Able to Profit from Your Death?, FORBES, 
Sept. 11, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/11/stoli-stranger-originated-life-insurance-
personal-finance-stoli.html. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Kramer, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 366. 
 331. Id. at 368. 
 332. Id. at 366. 
 333. Hawkins, supra note 328. 
 334. Kramer, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 363. 
 335. Id. 
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But the court is applying New York law, which gives the heirs of Kramer, a 
well-known lawyer who had to have known that he was participating in an 
insurance fraud, the opportunity to reap tens of millions because of his 
fraud.  That is not a desirable outcome.  The insurance companies should 
be able to void the policies and then pay the premiums received from the 
investors as a penalty for issuing the policies without adequately 
investigating the circumstances of their origination. 
In addition to the issue of insurable interest, these STOLI cases often 
include a misrepresentation claim.  An example is a 2009 case decided by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which held that an 
insurance company can rescind a life insurance policy for a material 
misrepresentation on the application.
336
  Eighty-one-year-old Sam 
Schoenthal applied to American General Life Insurance Company for a $7 
million life insurance policy.
337
  In his application he said his net worth was 
$10.7 million and his annual income was more than $150,000 when, in 
fact, his net worth was $160,000, and his annual income was $7,200.
338
  In 
one paragraph the Eleventh Circuit cited the district court‘s explanation of 
the ―complicated insurance investment mechanism‖ involving a ―maze of 
related entities‖ in which Schoenfeld was a participant, and then the court 
described some of the ―agents‖ and ―independent contractors‖ involved.
339
  
But the court did not discuss life settlements or STOLI at all:  it focused on 
the specific issue of the right under Georgia law of an insurance company 
to void a policy because of a material misrepresentation on an application 
and concluded that American General had the right in the instant case.
340
  
One has to wonder about the efficacy or existence of American General‘s 
due diligence regime if it could not discover such extreme exaggerations 
before issuing a large policy. 
Finally, a recent case decided in March 2010 by the U.S. District 
Court in Minnesota illustrates the greedy players in these financial schemes 
taking advantage of existing law to subvert the purpose of life insurance to 
obtain something for nothing.  In PHL Variable Insurance Company v. 
Morello,
341
 Jason Mitan, a disbarred lawyer with a felony conviction for tax 
evasion and bankruptcy fraud, approached his part-time hairdresser, Jeffrey 
Chiaro, about obtaining a life insurance policy for Chiaro‘s mother, Lucille 
Morello.
342
  Mitan introduced Morello to his associate David Claus, who 
 
 336. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Schoenthal Family, LLC, 555 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at 1335-36. 
 340. Id. at 1340-41. 
 341. PHL Variable Insurance Co. v. Lucille E. Morello 2007 Irrevocable Trust, No. 08-
572 (MJD/SRN), 2010 WL 2539755, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 3, 2010). 
 342. Id. at *2. 
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offered Morello free life insurance and explained that the policies obtained 
would be sold to third parties.
343
  Claus and Chiaro set up trusts that would 
own Morello‘s policies.
344
  Claus also provided a financial statement for 
Morello that he said was prepared by Certified Public Accountant John 
Abrams.
345
  The court noted that there was no official record of John 
Abrams or his accounting business.
346
 
The Lucille E. Morello 2007 Irrevocable Trust applied to PHL 
Variable Insurance Company (Phoenix) for a life insurance policy insuring 
Morello, and in its application the Trust affirmed that Morello had a net 
worth of almost $34 million and an annual income of more than 
$800,000.
347
  The Trust submitted a Statement of Client Intent (SOCI) 
stating that there was no intent to transfer an interest in the policy to a third 
party, and that the intent was to use the policy for ―estate conservation 
purposes.‖
348
  The Trust also submitted a report by Examination 
Management Services, Inc. (EMSI) to confirm the truth of the statements in 
the application.
349
  The EMSI representative approved the application after 
speaking with Morello, Chiaro, and Claus.
350
  In fact, Morello had assets of 
about $800,000 and an annual income of about $30,000.
351
 
Phoenix issued a life insurance policy with a $10 million death 
benefit, and the Trust paid premiums of over $500,000 after receiving a 
loan for more than that amount funded by the company that was going to 
be the ultimate purchaser of the Trust.
352
  Phoenix paid commissions to two 
insurance agents for a total of over $570,000.
353
  When Morello died within 
two years of the policy being issued, Phoenix did an investigation and 
concluded that the original application contained fraudulent information.
354
 
The district court held that the policy was void because of the 
―willfully false‖ statements on the application and that, under Minnesota 
law, the insurer is not required to return premiums paid when a policy is 
issued because of a fraud.
355
  The court opined that a ―contrary rule would 
be an invitation to commit fraud.‖
356
  The court did not acknowledge that 
the current rule is an invitation for insurance companies to provide life 
 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. at *3. 
 345. Id. at *2. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. at *1. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at *3. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at *2. 
 354. Id. at *3. 
 355. Id. at *4. 
 356. Id. 
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insurance policies to everyone without performing due diligence to see if 
the purchaser has an insurable interest and is entitled under the law to 
procure the policy.  Phoenix did an investigation and discovered the fraud 
when it had to pay out a $10 million death benefit.
357
  Phoenix did not 
bother to investigate when it gladly was accepting a premium of over half a 
million dollars, knowing that if there was a fraud involved, it would not 
have to pay out on the policy, and it would be able to keep the premiums 
paid.  There is so much money at stake for all the actors in these life 
settlement schemes that poorly considered regulation encourages bad 
behavior on all their parts. 
VIII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Life insurance serves the important public purpose of allowing people 
―to ensure from beyond the grave‖ that family members and business 
associates who relied on them will have the financial resources to maintain 
their lives.
358
  Life insurance keeps those people who have suffered 
personal losses from also suffering financial disasters, and it keeps them 
from burdening taxpayers. 
But life insurance policies are a peculiar financial product.  When 
people buy automobile insurance policies, their purpose is to lessen the risk 
that they will suffer significant financial repercussions if they are involved 
in car accidents that cause property damage or personal injuries.  When 
people buy homeowners policies, their purpose is to lessen the risk that 
they will suffer significant financial damage if, for example, someone slips 
and falls on their property incurring physical injuries.  If these policy 
owners never use their policies, they consider themselves lucky even 
though they have been paying premiums for many years.  Policy owners 
are paying to have risk coverage, not savings accounts.  They do not expect 
to get anything back after paying premiums for years.  Presumably if they 
had risk coverage plus savings accounts, their premiums would be much 
higher.  This last arrangement is the situation with whole life or universal 
life insurance.  It got to be that way because these financial products were 
and are big moneymakers for insurance companies. 
It is important to remember this life insurance history to see clearly 
that there is no good reason for life insurance policies to be investment 
vehicles, either simple ones in which original policy owners save for the 
future or complicated ones where investors buy shares of securitized pools 
of policies.  Realistically, there will, of course, be no change in the 
availability of whole and universal life policies, but using life insurance 
 
 357. Id. at *2. 
 358. See, e.g., Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of N.Y. v. Bernstein, No. 08-2641, 2009 WL 
1912468, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 29, 2009). 
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policies in a way that is completely unrelated to their original purpose 
could and should be banned.  There is, perhaps, one appropriate exception, 
to the idea of using life insurance only for its primary traditional purpose; 
and that is in the original viatical settlement situation.  If someone has an 
existing life insurance policy, no longer has a need for it, and is facing a 
dire health, financial, or family emergency, it is reasonable to permit that 
insured to sell the policy to the highest bidder.  In those circumstances, it 
would not be difficult for the insured to rebut a presumption that life 
insurance policies are being sold as mere investment tools. 
It is a mistake to encourage the ―same wild financial infrastructure‖ 
that led to the mortgage meltdown to subvert the underlying transaction of 
providing a death benefit for loved ones or business associates.
359
  
Securitizing pools of life insurance policies that have been purchased as life 
settlements has no connection to the purpose of the underlying product.  
The only purpose of these new transactions is to create huge fees for the 
brokers, agents, originators, and traders while adding nothing of value to 
society.
360
  
Just as there was a lack of transparency in the securitization of 
mortgages, there will be the same problem in the securitization of life 
insurance policies.
361
  Investors will not know how old the insureds are, 
what their medical conditions and life expectancies are, or how financially 
sound the insurance companies underwriting the policies are.  But in this 
kind of securitization there are the additional problems of preserving the 
privacy of the insureds and the unspoken fact that the sooner the insureds 
die, the better off investors are; quick deaths could make the difference 
between earning a substantial profit and taking a loss.  A Washington 
journalist had described the ―$26 trillion life insurance market‖ as ―ripe for 
 
 359. Weir, supra note 158, at 2 (quoting Michael Greenberger, former Director of 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission). 
 360. See generally Roger Lowenstein, Who Needs Wall Street?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
2010, (Magazine), at 15, 16 (arguing that devising complex financial instruments is not in 
the best interest of clients);  Klaus Schwab, Op-ed., Bank Bonuses and Communitarian 
Spirit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2010, at A19 (―The purpose of an enterprise–to create goods 
and services for the common good–has been replaced by a purely functional enterprise 
philosophy aimed at maximizing profits in the shortest time possible. . . . This development 
was particularly visible in the financial sector, where there is at best only an indirect 
connection with the original purpose of an enterprise, meaning the creation of substantive, 
real value.‖); Anniki Laine, Securities Speculation Tax, CITIZEN WORKS (Citizen Works, 
D.C.), 2009, at 1, http://www.citizenworks.org/admin/Microsoft%20Word%20-
%20SST.4DiscussionPiece.pdf (―Today, our economy is overwhelmingly dominated by a 
type of finance that has less to do with financing corporate production, and more to do with 
shuffling money around the market to make a profit.‖). 
 361. See generally Gretchen Morgenson, Pools That Need Some Sun, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
21, 2010, (Business), at 1, 8 (arguing that investors have lost confidence in securitization 
pools and that greater securitization is necessary to lure them back). 
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plucking a la subprime mortgage sleight of hand.  For the next big bubble, 
scam artists are buying, bundling, packaging, securitizing and selling 
‗stranger-owned‘ life insurance policies that ill and elderly people sell for 
cash.‖
362
  Such an unseemly financial undertaking should create in us the 
same kind of hostility engendered in eighteenth century England when life 
insurance wagers were popular. 
It would provide clarity and certainty if Congress acted to consolidate 
in one federal law a compilation of the various regulatory schemes enacted 
in most states.  But courts can also make life settlements very unattractive 
by strictly enforcing insurable interest laws and not allowing policy owners 
or life settlement agents to game the system.  In addition, insurance 
companies can take actions that would limit the reach of life settlement 
companies.  For example, although the insurable interest doctrine requires a 
relationship between the purchaser of a policy and the insured, the policy 
owner can designate any person or entity as a beneficiary.  Insurance 
companies could in their contracts require that for the life of the policy at 
least fifty percent of the death benefit be paid to people or entities with 
insurable interests or to a trust in which the beneficial interest is held by 
people or entities with insurable interests.
363
  Such a requirement would not 
prohibit the insured from changing beneficiaries during the life of the 
policy, but the fifty percent insurable interest requirement would remain 
constant, except in the case of medical, financial, or family dire change of 
circumstances.  That beneficiary change alone would undo the life 
settlement industry and securitization.  The industry would return to being 
a viatical settlement business and would not have sufficient numbers of 
policies to securitize them.  Life insurance companies should also 
reconsider the amount they pay out in surrender value so that life 
settlement offers would not look so attractive.  Life insurance companies 
are involved in so many lawsuits involving life settlements and are being 
threatened with such a major change in the way they do business that it is 
certainly in their interest to do their own due diligence in writing policies 
and in examining their own ways of doing business. 
In his opening statement at the Hearing on Recent Innovations in 
Securitization held by the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, 
Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Chairman Paul 
Kanjorski (D. Pa.) noted some important cautionary considerations before a 
public embrace of the current direction of the litigation settlement industry: 
[T]his industry . . . has the potential for substantial abuse. . . . The 
improper securitization of life settlements could ultimately leave 
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countless seniors penniless and innumerable investors broke.  
The idea of institutional investors profiting from a person‘s death 
also seems, to say the least, unsettling and immoral.  It leads us 
down a slippery slope that might eventually result in indexes 
based on divorce rates and swaps tied to gambling losses. . . .  
[T]he best policy [may be] to keep this Pandora‘s box shut.
364 
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